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Private equity (PE) boomed in the 2000’s, aligned with an increase in their debt levels. 
Traditionally, PE firms bought target companies using mostly debt to create short term growth 
and sell profitably. Nowadays, some PE firms transform their targets to create sustainable value. 
Yet, little work is published on leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the middle market with sustainable 
value creation for the target. The objective of this work is therefore to develop a real-world case 
study analyzing if a PE acquisition with LBO in the middle market fits the fund’s strategy for 
sustainable growth. This single case study was developed in Spain using qualitative and 
quantitative research conducted in 2020. The case studies the successful 2015 investment of the 
American PE firm Riverside in Euromed, a Spanish herbal extracts manufacturer. It shows that 
PE can benefit from sustainable improvement of a target company if all steps of an investment 
decision-making process are executed rigorously. 
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The private equity industry received a lot of attention starting in the 1980’s due to its high level 
of success, attaining its boom just before the 2008 financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2008, 
global private equity firms raised about €2 trillion of capital. Private equity (PE) is an alternate 
source of investment capital that is not listed in a public exchange (Segal, 2020). A PE firm is 
an organization that raises funds from high-net-worth individuals and institutions to finance 
transactions of buying and selling companies in a preset amount of years at a target profit 
through an exit strategy (Barber & Goold, 2007). PE executions vary from leveraged buyouts 
(LBO), using a combination of debt and equity to fund a transaction, to venture capital (VC), 
investing equity in a young company (Chen, 2020b). Nonetheless, the boom years of PE firms 
aligned with increase in their debt levels (Chen, 2020b), showing the contribution of LBO for 
PE success. However, PE success is not just about using debt in acquisitions in order to 
maximize returns. Consequently, it is important to understand how PE works and makes profit. 
There are two ways PE firms make their money. First, a PE firm usually charges investors a 
2% annual management fee of assets managed. Second, PE firms require approximately 20% 
of all the fund’s profits from selling companies in their portfolio (Chen, 2020b). Most of such 
transactions happen in the middle ($50 million-$500 million) to lower-middle market ($10 
million-$50 million). A common exit strategy is to sustainably improve a middle market 
company in order to sell it at a large profit to a large corporation. Given that the middle market 
has more sellers than buyers, a PE can acquire a target company at optimum price for a higher 
return (Segal, 2020). Finally, each fund will have specific criteria required for the investment, 
such as investment amount, which the PE firm must follow for its success (Barber & Goold, 
2007). Even with funds of trillions of euro under PE management (Segal, 2020), there are 
debates on the advantages and disadvantages of PE. 
The concept of PE offers several advantages for both target companies and investors. First, one 
of the greatest advantages for target companies is the access to liquidity as alternative to high 
interest bank loans. Liquidity and know-how for fast development and high growth is an 
advantage for every company receiving PE investments (GoCardless, n.d.). Second, good PE 
firms add sustainable value by executing excellent financial controls and enhancing 
performance including revenue, margin and cash flow. Furthermore, they improve governance 
structures by undertaking the roles of corporate managers and boards of directors to allow fast 
decision making. Additionally, PE firms generally have more freedom on how to use investor’s 
money than regulated public companies due to their structure as private partnership (Barber & 
Goold, 2007). Third, by asking top managers of the target company to personally invest in their 
portfolios, PE firms assure the management’s commitment. Possible large rewards due to a 
profitable sale at the end of the ownership make top management work more motivated. Finally, 
the business model of PE with use of debt and flexible exit strategies gives the investing 








The following disadvantages can be considered criticisms of PE. First, it can be difficult to 
liquidate an investment increasing the risk on returns for investors (Chen, 2020b). PE firms 
often face the difficulty to find a buyer after the time of investment. Since the value has already 
been increased there is often little potential for further growth of the target company, making it 
less attractive to buyers (GoCardless, n.d.). Moreover, there is no “ready-made order book” 
matching buyers with sellers. So, the PE firm must search actively for a buyer to sell the target 
company (Chen, 2020b). Second, critics claim that PE is just about asset stripping and seeking 
profit for the PE firm (Barber & Goold, 2007) even if the target company continues to struggle 
financially when a LBO has left a heavy debt burden (Segal, 2020). Third, in order to execute 
a successful investment, a PE firm must have the following skills identified by Barber and 
Goold (2007) which are hard to find and replicate in every transaction. To start, PE firms must 
dedicate enough capacity to proactively search for a good target with improvement 
opportunities. Additionally, the success of PE is very limited if it is not able to put together a 
professional, highly motivated executive team inside the target company and identify few 
strategic levers to improve the company’s performance. Last, managing a good balance between 
acquisitions and disposals is required. PE firms should already develop a profitable exit strategy 
during the acquisition process, which then gets adapted during the time of the project. 
The arguments against PE are rooted in lack of research, plan for sustainable operation 
improvement and profitable exit strategy during the investment decision-making process for 
value creation. We believe that PE can generate and benefit from sustainable improvement of 
target companies if the main steps for a PE investment decision-making process are executed 
rigorously and with professionalism. Due to the great supply and little demand for good middle 
market companies to buy, we see further potential for PE to create sustainable growth in the 
middle market. Case studies that improve business judgement for investment decision-making 
processes generating sustainable growth can better prepare future fund managers for successful 
investments. The objective of this work is therefore to develop a real-world case study that 
analyzes in-depth if a private equity acquisition in the middle market fits the fund’s strategy for 
sustainable growth, applying an LBO model with returns and risks. To develop this case, we 
analyzed Riverside’s investment in Euromed, a producer of herbal extracts in Spain. Riverside, 
an American PE, created sustainable growth by improving R&D, enhancing management and 
international sales team and by completing an add-on acquisition. These actions resulted in 
doubled earnings and about 30% increase in production capacity. Two years ahead of schedule, 
Riverside sold Euromed in a trade sale exit strategy to Dermapharma at a great return for 
investors (The Riverside Company, 2019). Riverside was selected as a single case study 
because it is a success story of how a PE using LBO in the middle market can create sustainable 
growth for a target company at a high return for investors. The case study guides the reader 
through the context and analysis of a real-life situation so that he or she can comprehend the 
reasons under the decisions made. Thus, it will serve as a learning tool to hone the business 
skills needed to successfully execute the decision-making process of a PE investment using 








 PRESENTATION OF THE CONTEXT 
As pioneers of teaching with case studies, Harvard Business School Publishing (HBSP) 
provides over 20.000 business cases from more than 50 prominent institutes around the world 
(Harvard Business School Publishing, n.d.). Emerald Case Studies is another source for case 
studies that has over 1.000 teaching cases across different business and management subjects 
(Emerald Insights, 2020). Even though most private equity transactions occur in the middle 
market (Segal, 2020), most case studies found in both HBSP and Emerald Insights Case Studies 
focus on large buyouts (Chaplinsky, Oppenheimer, & Patra, 2017; Raviv, Feuer, Mehrotra, & 
Rossman, 2017; Smith, Halperin, & Friedman, 2017; Stowell & Rainor, 2017). Large buyouts 
constitute transactions larger than $500 million (Segal, 2020). Furthermore, private equity’s 
new phase is to create sustainable value rather than just create short-term value (Ulrich & Allen, 
2016). Yet, most of the identified LBO cases focus on short-term value creation and heavy use 
of debt transferred to the target company as exemplified in the Stowell & Rainor (2017) and 
Smith, Halperin, & Friedman (2017) cases. The heavy use of debt on target company’s in these 
cases led to financial distress of the target company after the PE firm exits the investment. The 
few cases in the middle market use alternate forms of financing or focus in emerging markets 
(Ruback & Yudkoff, 2011; Quian Peng & Chow, 2013; Palepu, Khanna, & Bullock, 2007; 
Harris & Gaede, 2009; Rhodes-Kropf & Burbank, 2013; Loutskina, Sinha, & Ransler, 2010). 
The literature review on published teaching case studies shows that little work has been 
published on LBO transaction at the middle market with sustainable value creation for the target 
company. 
The cases retrieved from Emerald Insights (2020), generally from the United States of America 
(USA), provided evidence that existing works focus on large buyouts (Chaplinsky, 
Oppenheimer, & Patra, 2017; Raviv, Feuer, Mehrotra, & Rossman, 2017; Smith, Halperin, & 
Friedman, 2017; Stowell & Rainor, 2017). The cases “Toys “R” Us LBO” and “The 
Restructuring of Danfurn LLC” are examples of LBOs ending in financial distress due to the 
large amount of debt transferred to the target company and lack of long-term value creation 
(Smith, Halperin, & Friedman, 2017; Stowell & Rainor, 2017). The purpose of the cases 
developed by Raviv, A., Feuer, R.N., Mehrotra, P. and Rossmann, P. (2017) and Stowell & 
Rainor, (2017) is to illustrate and practice valuation methods used in an LBO which include 
risk and return analysis such as the ones presented in this case using IRR and multiples. 
While over 600 case studies focusing on private equity can be found in HBSP, only six focus 
on investments in the middle market. These analyzed cases take place in the USA and in 
emerging economies (Ruback & Yudkoff, 2011; Quian Peng & Chow, 2013; Palepu, Khanna, 
& Bullock, 2007; Harris & Gaede, 2009; Rhodes-Kropf & Burbank, 2013; Loutskina, Sinha, & 
Ransler, 2010). The case studies “Gemini Investors”, “Cathay Capital: An Entrepreneurial 
Private Equity Fund with a Cross-Border Investment Model” and “Blue River Capital” focus 
on the analysis of successful business strategies of PE firms, rather than sustainable 
improvement of target companies’ businesses (Ruback & Yudkoff, 2011; Quian Peng & Chow, 
2013; Palepu, Khanna, & Bullock, 2007). Both “Cathay Capital” and “Blue River Capital” 







“Lonestar Graphite” sets its focus on the introduction of PE to students to develop a business 
valuation for the first time (Harris & Gaede, 2009). But the large use of debt mentioned in the 
case to finance possible investments indicates no sustainable growth strategy for the target 
company. Although the case “Brazos Partners and the Tri-Northern Exit” analyzes a middle-
market leveraged buyout group, it’s purpose is the development of a successful exit strategy 
and to take a decision on when to exit from an investment (Rhodes-Kropf & Burbank, 2013). 
The most suitable case found in HBSP to learn how to develop a sustainable growth strategy 
for a target company is “Husk Power Systems: Financing Expansion”. The objective is to 
“evaluate how and why the proposed financing structure fits the current stage of the company’s 
development” (Loutskina, Sinha, & Ransler, 2010). However, taking into consideration the 
small investment size needed by the target company the case focuses on the development of a 
start-up in an emerging economy. Moreover, the financing structure offered by the PE firm in 
this case is not a leveraged buyout, but a short-term debt in form of a convertible note 
(Loutskina, Sinha, & Ransler, 2010). 
Thus, there is a need for case studies that focus on the development of business skills and 
judgements for an investment decision in the middle market, using LBO with the purpose to 
create sustainable growth. The original contribution of this work is a case study of sustainable 
value creation measures successfully implemented by a private equity firm for an investment 
decision in the middle market. Moreover, the investment is between USA and Spain in an 
established industry. The information presented in this case allows to answer the key questions 
for a private equity investment decision (Martínez, 2012):  
• What is the PE investing in? 
• Why should the PE make the investment? 
• What does the PE intend to do with the target company to obtain a return on investment? 
• What is the expected return and price to get that return? 
• What are the quantified risks in the investment? 
 METHODOLOGY 
This work uses a single case study design as a research method. A single case study is suitable 
when the research explains a current event and traces a process over time (Ying, 2017). The 
case study describes the business situation set in 2015 of a private equity’s decision-making 
process to acquire a target company. The companies analyzed for this case study were 
Riverside, the PE firm, and Euromed, the target company. Riverside’s investment in Euromed 
was selected as a single case study because it is a success story of how a PE using LBO in the 
middle market can create sustainable growth for a target company at a high return for investors. 
The aim of the case study is to perform an in-depth analysis of a real-world situation and identify 
the problem in order to serve as a learning tool on private equity investment decisions. 
Subsequently, different valuation scenarios are evaluated, and a viable action plan is proposed 








 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative research was conducted to understand and obtain the necessary information to 
present the context, business situation, problem and the decision that had to be made in the case. 
Both primary and secondary sources were used. Primary research consisted of two face-to-face 
in-depth interviews via a video conference platform. Both interviews were conducted separately 
to avoid bias in the answers of each respondent; the presence of the other interviewee could 
influence their openness. Eduardo Martínez Abascal, professor of Financial Management at 
IESE Business School, served as moderator for the first interview. Martínez Abascal has 
developed over 90 different publications of teaching material including case studies, teaching 
notes and technical notes. Given his vast expertise, he contributed to this case study as a 
consultant for its development. The second interview was moderated by Martí Sagarra, 
professor of Multinational Finance at the University of Barcelona (UB). He served as supervisor 
for this case study. In both interviews, with top management of Riverside and Euromed, 
seniority was considered for selection of the moderator. Both authors of this paper assisted the 
video conferences and took turns asking questions to probe main topics. An in-depth interview 
guideline with main topics of discussions was elaborated before each interview and shared with 
each respective respondent to help them prepare for the interview (see Annex A and Annex B). 
Each interview lasted about two hours. Video was enabled through an online platform to build 
rapport with the respondents. Due to confidentiality issues, recording these sessions was not 
authorized by the respondents. However, minutes of the interviews were taken by the two 
authors of this paper using the interview guide form, which were later compared to validate 
information and consolidated. The minutes were used as reference in the development of the 
case study to ensure the accuracy of the information presented. 
The first interview was conducted April 13th, 2020 with Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa, a Riverside 
Partner in the transacting team based in Spain. He executed the transaction process of acquiring 
Euromed for the private equity firm. Álvarez-Nóvoa found Euromed in Spain when looking for 
new investments in the ingredients industry, two years before the acquisition process began. He 
was a key player in identifying investment opportunity and determining if the investment was 
aligned with the fund’s strategy. The second interview took place on April 28th, 2020 with 
Xavier Roig, CEO of Euromed, the target company. Although Roig was not directly involved 
in the transaction, given that the seller was Meda AB, Euromed’s parent company at the time, 
he was influential in the success of the transaction. Top management is directly accountable for 
the implementation of the private equity’s sustainable growth plan and influential in the seller’s 
decision. Additionally, as CEO of Euromed, he was able to provide in-depth insight of 
Euromed’s business model, crucial to determine compliance with the fund’s investment criteria 
and financial analysis. 
Secondary research consisted of gathering published material on the internet of both companies 
and the acquisition to validate and complement the information provided during the interviews. 
Information validated and complimented with further detail from public sources included 







material included the company’s websites, articles and databases with descriptions of the 
companies and the acquisition. 
 Quantitative Methods 
Quantitative research allowed for an in-depth financial analysis of the valuation, price proposal 
and acquisition of the target company. In general, a company’s value can be different for 
different buyers or even between buyer and seller. The value of a company is not the same as 
the price, which is the amount agreed between buyer and seller. There are different methods for 
valuating a company (Martínez, 2012). According to Álvarez-Nóvoa (2020), discounted cash 
flow (DCF) and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
multiple were the two main valuation methods used by Riverside for the acquisition of 
Euromed. These two methods were recreated and executed for this case study. Secondary 
sources (Sabi database and Mercantile Registry) were used to retrieve financial data of the target 
company including historic Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statements (P&L) (see Annex 
C and Annex D). Data analysis up to the date of the acquisition in December 2015 was 
completed. P&L data analysis included: 
• Size of sales, growth and evolution: Used to determine if they were positive, negative or 
stagnant. The size of sales also indicated the size of the business. Sales growth was 
indicative of the business’s potential. 
• Gross margin as percentage of sales, evolution and analysis: Margin size can bring insight 
on market competition (e.g. large margin can indicate that there is little competition 
(Martínez, 2012)). 
• Operation expenses (Opex) and its evolution analysis: A comparison of Opex with gross 
margin gives insights on lack of profitability (if that were the case) (Martínez, 2012). 
• Profitability analysis: Used to identify net income amount and evolution of other indicators 
such as return on sales (ROS), return on equity (ROE) and debt. This provided 
understanding on whether Euromed made enough money to cover its debt and make new 
investments (Martínez, 2012). 
The P&L analysis answered if the target company made money and was profitable. 
Analysis of the Balance Sheet included: 
• Evaluation of need of funds for operation (NFO): These are the funds required to finance 
the operations of a company. It gave insights on the company’s strategy and were it is 
investing its funds (Martínez, 2012). 
• Analysis of investment in fixed assets and impact in sales: It provided insights on the 
company’s strategy and were it is investing its funds in the long term (Martínez, 2012). 
• Debt analysis: Indicated inflow or outflow of funds. 
• Evolution of working capital (WC): An assessment of NFO with regards to WC indicated 
if NFO had increased, WC had decreased or both (Martínez, 2012). 







Financial statements analysis was then combined with Riverside’s investment plan to formulate 
assumptions (see Annex H and Annex I) used to create a Balance Sheet and P&L forecast for 
the 5-year duration of the investment. This is what we called our base scenario. Based on the 
elaborated P&L and Balance Sheet forecasts, a DCF valuation analysis of Euromed, using cash 
flow for the shareholder, was carried out. DCF are generally the most suitable method to valuate 
a company because it determines the investments rate of return at a given initial price paid for 
the target company. It consists of discounting the future cash flows given that the value of a 
company comes from its capacity to generate cash (Martínez, 2012). Thus, the DCF analysis 
tries to determine the value of an investment today based on the forecast of how much money 
it is expected to make in the future (Chen, 2020a). In an investment project, such as the one 
presented in this case, the acquirer needs to know how much money they get to keep. The cash 
flow for the shareholder is the cash surplus after everything, including investments, taxes and 
debt, has been paid. So, cash flow for shareholder is used to calculate the return an investor can 
expect (Martínez, 2012). Cash flow for shareholder was calculated using the following method: 
± Variation of net assets (NA): NA of last year – NA of this year 
± Variation of debt: Debt of last year – debt of this year 
+ Net income of current year 
The calculation was applied to each year of forecast, starting from year of transaction (2015), 
up to the year of exit (2020). 
We also calculated risk using the DCF method. Risk is the variability in expected profits due to 
changes in cash flow (Martínez, 2012). For this, we made hypothesis on variations that can 
occur in our assumptions to simulate a worst-case scenario, in which all the negative variations 
occur at once, and a best-case scenario, in which all the positive variations occur at once. We 
repeated the DCF analysis for each scenario to quantify risk. Finally, the DCF analysis also 
allows to determine the success of the exit strategy (selling Euromed for a profit after the 5-
year investment) under all three scenarios (best, base and worst) by measuring the return of the 
investment project. This internal rate of return (IRR) is measured in Excel using the function 
“IRR ()”. A second valuation analysis was made using industry multiples of EBITDA. A 
valuation with multiples tries to determine the value of a company based on the size of an 
indicator from the company’s income statement, such as EBITDA. The steps used for the 
valuation using EBITDA multiple is detailed below (Martínez, 2012): 
• Determined comparable companies based on industry, size, profitability and that have been 
recently purchased (we considered last 10 years). 
• Identified EBITDA multiple at which comparable companies were purchased and 
calculated average and median. We increased and decreased multiple based on negotiation 
range required detailed in results section 5.4.1. 
• Multiplied EBITA multiples average by Euromed’s EBITDA in 2015 to obtain enterprise 
value (EV). 







Since valuation with multiples requires acquisitions of comparable companies, they are used 
when a buyer wants a valuation based on market behavior. Comparable companies were 
determined from the interview with Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa. Criteria for comparable companies 
are detailed in the Valuation Process section 4.5.4. The multiple provides the price that should 
be paid for the company and should be compared with results from DCF method (Martínez, 
2012). In summary, the two valuation methods chosen, DCF and EBITDA multiple, allow to 
valuate a company based on two perspectives: company’s performance using DCF and market 
behavior using multiples to determine an initial price proposal. 
 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The results of the case study present the necessary analyses (steps) for a successful private 
equity acquisition as a learning tool to enhance the skills and business judgment in similar 
business situation. The analysis includes the target company’s compliance with Riverside’s 
investment criteria. The criteria were provided by Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa in the interview. 
Additionally, the data interpretation from the valuation analysis of the target company includes 
the following: DCF analysis with IRR and sensitivity analysis to determine profitability and 
risk of the 5-year investment and EBITDA multiples to determine appropriate price to ensure 
profitability. Both the compliance of the criteria and the valuation data interpretation leads to 
the appropriate proposal for the transaction including bidding price and return for the fund. 
 PRESENTATION OF THE CASE 
The information presented in this case allows to answer the key questions for Riverside’s 
investment decision (Martínez, 2012): 
• What is Riverside investing in? This requires a deep understanding of Euromed’s business 
and historic financial performance. 
• Why should Riverside make the investment? To answer this, an analysis of strategic fit 
should be made. 
• What does Riverside intend to do with Euromed to obtain a return on investment? 
• What is the expected return and price to get that return? 
• What are the quantified risks in the investment? 
Although the investment decision is based on profitability and risk, it is important to first look 









Riverside, an American private equity firm, had successfully invested in the ingredient’s 
companies Capol in 2009 and Mec 3 in 2014. They wanted to continue to invest in the 
ingredient’s category. Through Riverside's partner in Spain, Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa, in 2013 
they found Euromed, a leading B2B herbal extracts manufacturer. Although at this moment 
Euromed was not for sale by its parent company, Meda AB, it allowed Riverside to build a 
relationship with Euromed and get to know the company well. By the time Euromed was for 
sale in 2015, Riverside had a head start in knowledge of the business and relationship with 
management (The Riverside Company, 2019). 
In spring 2015 the teaser from Meda AB for the sale of Euromed arrived. This is “an anonymous 
document that provides just enough nonconfidential information to pique the interest of 
[possible] buyer” (Snow, 2018, p. 47). After executing a confidentiality agreement, in which 
buyers assure not to share any confidential information with third parties, Riverside received 
Euromed’s information memorandum, often referred to as deal book. This deal book contains 
detailed information about financials, customers, products, operations, personnel, legal, etc. of 
the target company (Snow, 2018). Riverside immediately started elaborating a letter of intent 
(LOI), also known as a non-binding offer; the first offer made in a sales process. A LOI helps 
identify similarities and differences between the opinions of both seller and buyer on specific 
topics of the transaction. It normally consists of an indicative price and its clarification (in the 
presented case the indicative offer was legally not binding), the conditions of each party, timing 
issues, a definitive agreement, the confidentiality of the offer and an explanation of the terms 
of payment (Corporate Finance Institute, 2019a).Due to the former contact between Riverside 
and Euromed, the private equity firm already knew its target company and was – compared to 
other possible buyers – able to prepare a more detailed and closer oriented to the target’s 
business LOI. Other investors, such as private equity firms or Euromed’s competitors, were 
interested in buying Euromed as well. Moreover, the mergers and acquisition (M&A) process 
was characterized by a lot of advisors and consultancies in legal, tax, etc. 
After the given period of three weeks, in which all possible buyers could submit their LOI, the 
phase of negotiation started (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). This phase is intended for the in-detail 
discussion of concrete terms for the possible contract (Corporate Finance Institute, 2019a). 
During this time only four to five offerors with the best indicative prices were involved in 
negotiations with the seller, including Riverside (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Since both Riverside 
and Meda AB had set target prices, they collaborated on different issues other than price, such 
as strategic supply arrangements, to include in the negotiation. In order to reach an agreement 
on a specific contract, they adapted the zone of possible agreements (ZOPA), the “area where 
two or more negotiating parties may find common ground” (Halton, 2019). 
Following the usual M&A procedure, a due diligence (DD) was exercised from Rothschild, 
Meda’s financial assessor for the transaction, to Riverside (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). In this 
process “a detailed examination and analysis of every aspect of the target company’s operations 
– its financial metrics, assets and liabilities, customers, human resources, etc.” (Corporate 







review the seller’s DD and established an additional DD based on factors like products, markets, 
insurance, management, personnel, legal and fiscal aspects (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
Now, Riverside had to decide whether investing in Euromed aligned with the fund’s strategy. 
If so, the private equity firm also had to decide the correct price for a successful investment. 
After the final agreement, both firms would have to sign the purchase and sale contract, often 
referred to as sales and purchase agreement (SPA). Additionally to the SPA, as agreed in the 
negotiations, a supply contract with the company currently owning Euromed was needed. 
 Sectoral Information 
The first step in an investment decision is to understand the business (Martínez, 2012). From 
an industry-based view, insight on the industries competitive environment will provide 
understanding of Euromed’s financial performance in 2015. As a producer of herbal extracts, 
Euromed operated in the botanical extract market, which is a segment of the global 
biotechnology market (Technavio, 2018). Based on this fact, biotechnology, as parent industry 
of the botanical extract market, is presented in this section. Market size and segmentation get 
analyzed, before main drivers, opportunities, key challenges and risks are described. Moreover, 
paragraph 4.2.6 gives insight in the competitive landscape. An analysis of the market for herbal 
and traditional products as Euromed’s target market follows afterwards. 
4.2.1. Market Definition & Application 
The biotechnology industry included the development, manufacturing and commercialization 
of products with the support of advanced biotechnology research. Main activities of 
participating companies in this sector were product research and development (R&D), 
technology licensing, product sales as well as research funding (MarketLine, 2019). 
Biotechnology used technology “to modify and use biological systems for industrial purposes 
and human welfare” (Technavio, 2018). More accurately, it designed new products or 
technologies for food, energy, rare diseases or the environment by improvingly changing the 
structure of plants and animals (Technavio, 2018). 
The market could be divided into five different category segments, namely 
‘Medical/Healthcare’, ‘Food & Agriculture’, ‘Environment & Industrial Processing’, ‘Service 
Provider’ and ‘Technology Service’. The most important segment was ‘Medical/Healthcare’ 
with a global market share of 58,4% by 2018 (see Table 1). This segment represented over 75% 








Table 1: Biotechnology industry market share of category segmentation 
Category Global market 
share in 2018 [%] 
Market share in 
Spain in 2014 [%] 
Medical/Healthcare 58,4% 75,3% 




Service Provider 9,9% 9,7% 
Technology Service 8,5% 1,7% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: MarketLine (2019); MarketLine (2015) 
4.2.2. Market Size 
The year 2015 was marked by double digit growth of 10,3% down from a growth of 15,1% in 
2014 for the biotechnology industry. This growth was expected to decelerate but remain strong. 
The global biotechnology industry value reached €282,7 billion in 2015 (MarketLine, 2019). 
By 2018, the biotechnology industry was expected to grow a 9% versus the previous year and 
reach a value of €350,5 billion (see  
Table 2) which represents a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8,1% between the years 
of 2014-2018 (MarketLine, 2019). 
Table 2: Global biotechnology industry value: € billion 
Year € billion % Growth 
2014 256,2 15,1% 
2015 282,7 10,3% 
2016 299,3 5,9% 
2017 321,6 7,5% 
2018 350,5 9,0% 
                                          Source: MarketLine (2019) 
The USA represented the greatest share by value (48,2%), followed by Asia-Pacific (24,0%) 
and Europe (18,1%) (MarketLine, 2019). In 2014, Spain accounted for 33,5% of the European 
biotechnology industry value reaching €23,6 billion. By 2015 it was projected to grow 9,8% at 
€23,6 billion. Forecast of Spain biotech industry value for 2018 was €32,6 billion with an 








4.2.3. Market Drivers 
Main drivers of the biotechnology industry were increasing consumer spending, governmental 
initiatives to support technological development, new technology, accessible raw materials as 
well as funding budgets for R&D opportunities. A change in the consumers behavior and 
therefore consumer spending effected the whole value chain up to the research and production 
of biotechnological products. Moreover, planned governmental initiatives for the near future 
supporting technological innovations defined a chance for doing business in this sector in 
Germany. However, government regulations were very strict in most countries (MarketLine, 
2019). Due to the importance of automated and semi-automated manufacturing and packaging 
equipment, as well as efficient and sustainable information technology systems like databases 
or enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, technology was one of the most important 
market drivers. A distribution network of reliable suppliers and the importance of high-quality 
products let raw materials be an additional driver. The gained funding options from companies 
determined their financial resources for the R&D of new products (MarketLine, 2019). 
4.2.4. Market Opportunities 
First Research (2019) states four different opportunities for companies operating in the industry. 
The first market opportunity was ‘ingredient awareness’. In 2015, many people were more 
conscious about ingredients in the food they bought than in previous years. This awareness of 
healthy ingredients “could drive growth among consumers who [wanted] to know the quality 
of ingredients used in food and other consumable goods” (First Research, 2019). By offering 
products from natural botanicals, companies could attract more customers and thus, increase 
their sales. The second prospect for companies in this industry was ‘sports performance 
supplements’. With more consumers engaged in athletic activities, the interest in maintaining 
health and fitness concerns increased, which led to more people seeking nutritional food 
supplements. The ‘weight loss market’ as a third opportunity focused on the obesity epidemic 
in several countries around the world, mainly the USA. The awareness of this issue, awoken by 
governments and health organizations, increased the demand for healthy food alternatives. 
Lastly, the ‘growth in e-commerce’ gave companies the possibility to use the increasing demand 
of consumers via internet. Online education and targeted marketing could help promote a 
specific demographic market and increase not only the company’s revenue, but also its 
reputation. 
4.2.5. Key Market Challenges & Risks 
Although the industry was growing both at a global and local level in Spain, there were several 
challenges and risks that had to be taken into consideration. First, government requirements for 
ingredients quality were high. Officials in Europe scrutinized the use of unapproved or 
prohibited ingredients. Keeping up with requirements and guidelines faced a threat to disrupt 
some of the industries supply chain. Second, the biotechnology industry had a high liability 
risk. Claims that resulted from contaminated or tampered products led to costly litigation 
procedures. Third, negative claims also caused the risk of negative publicity, especially if there 







with similar ingredients that could not always be protected with patents (First Research, 2019). 
Even if they had some protection of intellectual property, “bio-generics” were a growing 
concern (MarketLine, 2015) since they are similar or comparable to the original in composition 
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.). 
4.2.6. Competitive Landscape 
The global competitive landscape of biotechnology was dominated by firms that operated in 
the medical and healthcare segment. Particularly in economies where the biotechnology 
industry was more mature such as Europe, Japan and the United States, there was rivalry among 
several start-ups, SMEs together with a small number of large companies. The large revenues 
of these companies allowed them to invest strongly in R&D in order to create new and 
innovative products (MarketLine, 2019). 
The Spanish competitive market by the end of 2014 is described below based on the Five Forces 
Analysis. Overall, it was an attractive industry for firms with high R&D capacities and 
intellectual property due to high entry barriers and moderate competition. Players taken into 
consideration are companies that had R&D related to biotech as well as offering products using 
biotech techniques. The buyers of the industry are identified as healthcare providers and B2B 
end users. On the other hand, suppliers are considered producers of biotech consumables, 
software and lab equipment (MarketLine, 2015). 
• The level of rivalry among competitors was increased in Spain’s mature market due to the 
existence of several start-ups and SMEs competing next to a few large companies such as 
Astra Zeneca. Many firms looked to differentiate by finding a niche market in which to 
focus. Regardless of the target company, competitors were on a race to discover new 
product solutions. Thus, constant, high-risk investments in R&D and clinical trials 
increased rivalry. However, as the industry was growing, the level of competition also 
diminished, allowing competitors to increase revenues without cutting into their 
competitors market shares. A race for innovation in a growing industry created a moderate 
level of competition (MarketLine, 2015). 
• The buyers bargaining power was increased by the presence of large sized buyers ranging 
from healthcare providers to the agriculture market. Nonetheless, players in the biotech 
industry had specialized and differentiated products to offer to buyers. Specifically, for 
ingredients of prescription medicine, there was a possibility that prices were regulated by 
the government (MarketLine, 2015). Buyers, precisely pharmaceutical companies, had to 
register ingredients of their medicines in a Drug Master File, used to submit to government 
agencies for approval. The process for approval took between 2-3 years. Therefore, 
pharmaceutical companies only had 1 or 2 suppliers for each type of ingredient. The cost 
of changing suppliers from the biotech industry due to quality requirements and approvals 
was high for buyers. Finally, ingredients represented a small percentage of the cost of final 
products, so buyers rarely changed suppliers (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Considering the size 
of buyers was offset by the rigorous certification process requiring high quality biotech 
products, specifically in the pharmaceutical industry, the buyers bargaining power was 







• Most importantly, the value of a biotech firm came from its intellectual property, thus they 
were not very dependent on suppliers. Furthermore, there was little differentiation amongst 
suppliers for the Spanish biotech market. Manufacturers of lab equipment and software 
were major suppliers for the biotech industry of which biotech firms had vast choices for 
quality and cost relationship. Nonetheless, quality raw materials were essentials for players 
in the biotech market and depended highly on lab equipment. The suppliers of both raw 
material and lab equipment also served clients in other industries and there was a low 
probability that biotech firms would vertically integrate to either markets. All things 
considered, the bargaining power of suppliers was also moderate (MarketLine, 2015). 
• Although the growth of the industry was attractive for new entrants, proprietary knowledge 
in biotech was very high and critical for success. Thus, a lot of investment in R&D was 
required. Investment in R&D could be a challenge for start-ups as there were high fixed 
cost and profits were initially low given the long discovery and innovation period to bring 
a new product to market. Additionally, government regulations were strict and incurred in 
additional costs. These regulations took time (increasing time to market) and were costly 
as they required clinical trials and safety testing. Furthermore, these clinical tests had 
compulsory processes and standards for quality and safety established by different 
regulators. High entry barriers made the threat of new entrants weak (MarketLine, 2015). 
• The main substitutes for the medical biotech industry were therapeutic drugs using 
chemical synthesis (MarketLine, 2015). However, the effectiveness of synthetics drugs had 
come into question (Gale, 2018) and therefore contributed to the growth of biotechnology. 
Patent protection slowed down the threat of alternative chemicals but over time other firms 
could produce similar products at a lower cost making the threat of substitutes moderate 
(MarketLine, 2015). 
Leading companies in the Spanish biotech industry included AstraZeneca PLC, Esteve Group, 
Grifols, S.A. and Zeltia, S.A. The first company, AstraZeneca PLC, recorded revenues of 
$25.711 million in 2013, representing an 8,1% decrease compared to the previous year. Its only 
business segment was pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, Esteve Group operated in both 
pharmaceutical and chemical products but did not disclose its financial data. Grifols, S.A. 
recorded revenues of €1.417,9 million in 2013 with a 6,6% growth. The company had four 
divisions which included bioscience, diagnostic, hospital and raw materials. Finally, Zeltia, 
S.A. reported revenue growth of 5,6% in 2013, reaching €103,9 million in revenues. The group 
focuses in biopharmaceuticals and consumer chemicals (MarketLine, 2015). Euromed had 
revenues of about €37 million in 2013 with a 9% growth (Sabi, 2020). 
Global competitors of natural extracts that had recently been acquired by Naturex, an American 
manufacturer of natural ingredients, included Berkem from France, Chart Corporation from the 
United States of America and Hammer Pharma from United Kingdom. The latter, Hammer 
Pharma, had the most amount of revenue with sales of €7,7 million.  The American company 
Charter Corporation followed with sales of €5,7 million. Berkem was the smallest of the three 







4.2.7. Target Market: Herbal / Traditional Products 
Closely tied to the biotechnology industry, herbal/traditional medicine was making a strong 
comeback as consumers were looking for “safer and natural” alternatives (Euromonitor 
International, 2011). Natural health products analyzed in this section include the categories of 
‘OTC’, ‘Sports Nutrition’, ‘Vitamins and Dietary Supplements’ and ‘Weight Management and 
Wellbeing’ (Euromonitor International, 2019). Pharmaceutical companies also returned to 
sources of herbal medicine since most synthetic drugs did not have the expected health impact 
(Gale, 2018). Nonetheless, increasing regulations in Western Europe, North America and Asia-
Pacific constrained sales (Euromonitor International, 2011). By 2015, the total market size of 
natural consumer health products reached $40.000 million, representing a 4% global growth. 
Asia Pacific represented nearly 60% of the market size, followed by Western Europe with 16% 
and North America with 15% (Euromonitor International, 2019). Spain’s herbal product sales 
increased 2,37%, reaching €302 million (Euromotinor International, 2020b). Although the 
Spanish growth rate was lower than the global growth rate, Spanish consumers showed a 
growing trend of going back to traditional products which resulted in a greater demand for 
herbal products. This trend of going back to traditional products was forecasted to continue as 
far as 2024 (Euromonitor International, 2020a). 
Dietary supplements, substances intended to fill a nutritional or wellness gap, drove the sales 
in herbal products, followed by cough, cold and allergy remedies as the second largest global 
category. At a global level, ginseng led the market in natural supplements reaching a market 
size of $2,1 billion in 2014. Other supplements such as ginkgo, biloba and echinacea also had 
high levels of consumer awareness. However, ginseng’s lead in the market could be explained 
by consumer perceptions of a ‘cure all’ product, which contributed to its global popularity 
(Euromonitor International, 2019). 
The growth of natural supplements was driven by new ingredients and new demands. The best-
known ingredients such as ginseng and ginkgo dominated the market. However, consumers 
were looking to expand benefits and functionality either through newer supplements or a 
combination of supplements to satisfy a new need such as immune response and brain function 








 The Target Company: Euromed in 2015 
The target company is the acquired entity in an investment. To further the understanding of the 
business from a resource-based view (focused on how individual firms differ from each other 
(Peng, 2013)), this section introduces Euromed as the target company and gives insight on its 
core business. First, main products, the sales structure and customers get analyzed. Then, 
paragraph 4.3.2 explains the production process and operations. The management, personnel 
and business climate are described afterwards. Finally, Euromed’s strategy analysis closes this 
section. 
4.3.1. The Business: Products, Sales & Customers 
The Spanish company Euromed sold herbal extracts and natural active substances used as 
components for the final products of the pharmaceuticals, nutraceuticals, functional foods and 
cosmetic industries (Euromed S.A., n.d.). The company was global leader in two types of 
extracts due to their proven track record. The first types of extracts were taken from the Milk 
Thistle seed and were used as ingredients to treat liver failure. The second extracts came from 
the fruit of the Saw Palmetto plant growing in the Everglades, Florida. This last extract 
ingredient was used primarily to treat prostate cancer, but it was also used to treat hair loss 
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Nonetheless, in 2015 Euromed had an extensive product list of over 20 
different botanical species extracts including gingko biloba dry extract intended to treat 
memory loss due to aging, ginseng dry extract used to fight fatigue and echinacea angustifolia 
root dry extract used to promote and support the immune system (Euromed S.A., 2015b). 
Traditional products included St. John’s Wort extract to treat depression and Horse Chestnut 
(The Riverside Company, 2019) for chronic venous insufficiency (National Center for 
Complementary and Integrative Health, 2016). Most of their products were free of additives 
and genetically modified organisms known as GMOs (The Riverside Company, 2019), 
enhancing Euromed’s natural image. GMOs are life forms whose genetic makeup has been 
modified in a laboratory to obtain a desired trait (Fridovich-Keil & Diaz, 2020). Euromed’s 
manufacturing plant in Mollet del Valles, Spain extracted more than 4.000 tons of biomass a 
year to produce about 600 tons of extracts to meet their customer’s needs (Euromed S.A., 
2015a). Revenue reached about €42,6 million in 2015 with 7% growth (see Annex C and Annex 
D for financial data). 
Pharmaceuticals were Euromed’s main customers, accounting for up to 65% of their sales (The 
Riverside Company, 2019). Euromed’s herbal extracts and natural active substances were the 
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) for pharmaceutical products. API suppliers needed to 
be in a Drug Master File submitted to obtain approvals and certifications (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 
2020) such as approvals from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Drug Master File 
contains product traceability and analysis of impurities in the product (Roig, 2020). As part of 
their services, Euromed gave clients the option of providing documentation required for Drug 
Master File and other certifications (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Clients in this industry included 
global companies such as Pfizer and Merck. However, 30% of their total sales came from its 







The nutraceuticals industry accounted for about 30% of Euromed’s sales (The Riverside 
Company, 2019). Nutraceuticals are substances that provide a physiological benefit or protect 
against chronic diseases (Nasri, Baradaran, Shirzad, & Rafieian-Kopaei, 2014). This industry 
included clients like Herbalife that developed and sold dietary supplements (Roig, 2020) such 
as products for healthy aging or digestive health (Herbalife International of America, Inc., 
2020). Although both nutraceuticals and pharmaceuticals had ingredients that cure or prevent 
diseases, only pharmaceuticals had governmental sanctions and therefore were much more 
regulated (Nasri, Baradaran, Shirzad, & Rafieian-Kopaei, 2014). Because nutraceuticals were 
less regulated, there was more competition for ingredients suppliers. Nonetheless, Euromed 
guaranteed its clients quality and traceability as well as clinical studies as a competitive 
advantage. Natural supplements, growing at close to 10% annually in the USA, presented a 
huge growth opportunity (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
Finally, only about 5% of their sales went to the functional foods and cosmetic industry (The 
Riverside Company, 2019). Herbal ingredients, such as aloe vera or olive oil, represent a very 
small percentage of the components of cosmetics. On the other hand, with the growing trends 
in health and fitness, herbal ingredients with physiological benefits represented an opportunity 
for sales growth in the functional foods industry. Nonetheless, this industry was not a mayor 
target for Euromed at the time  (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
Through their products and services, Euromed supplied more than 350 customers located in 35 
countries around the world (Euromed S.A., 2015a). Due to the strength of the 
phytopharmaceutical (herbal medicines) industry in Germany, the country represented almost 
50% of its sales. With the growth of nutritional supplements, the USA became the second most 
important market. Asia, as a new market with high growth potential, was also important (Roig, 
2020). 
4.3.2. Production and Operation 
All of Euromed’s extracts complied with the global Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) 
norms, international pharmacopoeias (this is a legally binding collection, elaborated by a 
governmental authority, with quality standards and specification for medicines in that 
jurisdiction (World Health Organization, 2020)), and international regulations. Furthermore, 
Euromed had validated and implemented mandatory methods for manufacture that included 
inspections to guarantee analytical, chemical and therapeutic (i.e. healing) quality standards. 
The company also applied their many years of expertise to establish R&D, laboratory analyses, 
processes and technologies. The main concern during production was the safety and 
effectiveness of the product (Euromed S.A., n.d.). 
So, Euromed controlled the supply chain, from the farmers to the final product, in order to 
ensure traceability of their products (The Riverside Company, 2019). For starters, Euromed had 
rigorous procedures in place for botanical sourcing. The company made a strict selection of 
plant products that complied with the guidelines of Good Agricultural and Collection Practices 
(GACP) (Euromed S.A., n.d.). In some cases, Euromed sold their own seeds to farmers and 







the fruit was critical to guarantee product quality, Euromed installed their own drying plant near 
the supplier in Florida to control the process (Roig, 2020). Once Euromed received the raw 
material in their factories, it was conserved in optimum conditions to preserve freshness and 
integrity. The raw material was also tested in compliance with international regulations and 
pharmacopoeias. These tests included identification of species, control of active principles and 
possible impurities such as heavy metals and pesticides (Euromed S.A., n.d.). 
Up-to-date technologies were applied for the extraction process. These technologies ranged 
from multiple extraction methods to specific drying procedures. Additionally, further steps of 
purification such as liquid-liquid extraction and crystallization were required for highly 
concentrated botanical derivatives (Euromed S.A., n.d.). The challenge Euromed faced was the 
drying capacity of an old piece of equipment to produce powder extracts that required a big 
investment to replace (The Riverside Company, 2019). Furthermore, the current plant in Mollet 
del Valle already operated at almost maximum of its capacity, limiting ability of significant 
growth (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). It was also very difficult to increase production capacity of new 
and existing extracts at their current plant given the available space and machinery (Roig, 2020). 
Quality was essential throughout the entire production process in Euromed. Thus, they were 
committed to continuous improvement of processes and quality control in all the supply chain. 
Euromed implemented and certified a Quality Assurance System that complied with the ISO 
9001 standards, as the basis of their Total Quality Management System (Euromed S.A., n.d.). 
ISO 9001 is a standard that provides the criteria for a quality management system based on a 
number of quality management principles that include strong customer focus, involvement of 
top management, process approach and continuous improvement (ISO, 2020). A third-party 
verification of the quality system gave clients a guarantee of traceability and compliance of 
requirements made by the clients. The quality assurance system included raw material testing, 
during production controls and final extracts analyses. Cutting-edge laboratory instruments 
were used for identification and quantification of raw materials, extracts and natural active 
principles (Euromed S.A., n.d.). 
In 2015, Euromed had inventory of about €26 million which represented almost 62% of its 
operating revenue (Sabi, 2020). Euromed stocked up when harvest was high and prices low for 
two main reasons. First, crop harvest volatility (supply can vary due to weather and 
geographical factors) made prices fluctuate. Second, some crops’ harvests were seasonal. For 
example, Saw Palmetto only had one harvest a year. By stocking up, Euromed made sure they 








4.3.3. Management and Personnel 
Euromed had around 165 employees worldwide, of which the majority worked in production. 
Some of the employees had been working over 30 years in the company, forming a reliable and 
well-rehearsed team of experts. Xavier Roig, CEO of Euromed, oversaw the company. As a 
trained pharmacist, he was a very professional and experienced CEO, with specialized 
knowledge of the production process. He was down-to-earth and passionate about his work. 
Together with the CFO and COO of the company he formed Euromed’s senior management 
team. Since this team founded the company, they had profound industry expertise and know 
how (The Riverside Company, 2019). With structural independence from the existing 
organizational matrix and excellent management of quality, traceability and clinical studies, top 
management led Euromed as a pioneer in the pharmaceutical industry of Spain and leader in 
the European herbal extract sector. Moreover, due to the complex production process and 
required knowledge, Euromed’s top management had a major influence on the decision of the 
company’s ownership (Roig, 2020). 
The entire management team was formed by the three senior managers and six heads of 
department including quality control, purchasing, documentation & services, quality assurance, 
legal department and IT (Euromed S.A., 2015a). The relationship between management and 
employees could be described as very trust-based, robust and open. Due to top management’s 
transparent and communicative leadership style, the business climate was very good, and 
employees could enjoy working in the team. Highly motivated workers helped the company 
achieve its goals and continue its growth plan (Roig, 2020). 
4.3.4. Strategy 
With the development of new extracts just two years after the company’s foundation, Euromed 
focused from the beginning on growth and customer expansion. Due to the early entrance into 
the Spanish market, the company excelled its production process and gained worldwide market 
leadership in the Milk Thistle plant and the Saw Palmetto palm tree extracts, mentioned in 
section 4.3.1. The combination of focus on market leadership in these two extracts and further 
development of new products led to Euromed’s rapid ascend as key player in the 
phytopharmaceutical industry. The expansion to the natural supplement market of the USA in 
1995 helped the company grow further. This market grew around 7-8% annually, while the 
phytopharmaceutical sector grew only around 2-3% (Roig, 2020). Additionally, the expansion 
helped stabilize the fluctuation of seasonal sales caused by the European climate. Moreover, 
expanding to another market decreased the dependence on just one market. The following 
SWOT analysis helps identify internal key strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) of the company 
in 2015, while opportunities (O) and threats (T) analyze external market influences on the 
company. 
First, Euromed’s resources and capabilities must be identified to establish the company’s 
strengths. Afterwards, with help of a VRIO framework (Peng, 2013) we analyze the value (V), 
rarity (R), inimitability (I), and organization (O) of Euromed’s business model. Table 3 gives 







Table 3: Euromed's Resources and Capabilities 
Euromed’s Tangible Resources and Capabilities 
Financial • Increasing sales and net income in recent years 
Physical • Saw Palmetto drying plants located close to supplier’s farms 
• Commercial offices all around the world 
Technological • Up-to-date technologies applied for the production process 
• Several patent ownerships 
Organizational • Implemented and certified Quality Assurance System 
Euromed’s Intangible Resources and Capabilities 
Human • Highly experienced management team 
• Over the years developed know-how (about production process) 
• Open communication and enjoyable business climate 
Innovation • Competitive R&D capabilities and product innovation 
Reputation • High customer satisfaction due to high quality standards and 
traceability 
• Strong partnerships within its supply chain network 
Source: adapted from Peng (2013) 
a. Euromed’s Strengths: With the resources and capabilities listed in Table 3, Euromed was 
able to gain competitive advantage and an important position in the market. Through the 
close management of quality, traceability and clinical studies, the company was able to 
create value. The company perfected the quality of its products due to the production 
process know-how developed over the years. They could guarantee traceability by 
controlling the process from seed selection and plant cultivation up to the final extract. 
There were only about five competitors worldwide that had the same quality standards as 
Euromed (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020), indicative of the rarity of Euromed’s competitive 
advantage. Close ties to its original mother company, Madaus in Germany, gave Euromed 
access to important clinical studies. Another key strength of the company was continuous 
product differentiation. Working together with business partners in several countries and 
hemispheres and offering a wide range of products for different types of markets 
guaranteed sales stabilization over the whole year. Euromed’s supply chain network built 
over the years, its close relationship with suppliers and clients and strict procedures was 
something its competitors were unable to imitate. Lastly, the flexibility of the 
organizational matrix structure, the know-how of highly experienced employees and the 
good business climate were indicators of proper organization. These factors increased both 
employee satisfaction and motivation and resulted in improvement of the service level and 








b. Euromed’s Weaknesses: Main weakness of Euromed’s strategy in 2015 was the lack of 
financial investment. The company worked at near maximum level of its production 
capacity (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). By procuring new machinery the company could have 
eliminated this bottleneck. Additionally, an investment in R&D could lead to the 
development of new extracts or further improvement of existing products. Furthermore, 
most of Euromed’s products were oriented to pharmaceuticals, neglecting growth 
opportunities with other industries such as nutraceutical and food. Furthermore, about 30% 
of their sales were concentrated in one company, Meda AB. Not only was Euromed 
dependent on one industry, but on one client as well. A focus on pharmaceutical industry 
also limited innovation and product launches, since the certification process of a new 
pharmaceutical ingredient could last up to three years. To overcome dependence of the 
pharma industry and increase production, heavy investment in R&D and machinery was 
required. But without asking lenders for more debt the company was not able to spend such 
sums of money. 
c. Opportunities for Euromed: Further expansion into the natural supplement market with an 
annual growth rate of 7-8% was a big opportunity for Euromed to increase the number of 
clients and growth. Since Euromed had vast experience in applying quality standards that 
went above and beyond current regulations, it was one step ahead of its competitors in the 
compliance of upcoming regulations (Roig, 2020). Even so, the natural supplements 
market allowed for a shorter time to market by eliminating the years of certification 
required in the pharma industry. Thus, innovation driven by consumer trends could 
increase sales for Euromed with more frequent product innovations. Greater focus on the 
natural supplements market also gave Euromed the opportunity to boost sales in territories 
where this market was growing, such as the USA and Asia. 
d. Threats for Euromed: Although the natural supplement market promised a high growth 
rate, competition was also great. The industry attracted a lot of low-cost competitors, which 
increased the dynamics of the market. Low-cost products from competition was the biggest 
threat for Euromed back then. Euromed’s high-quality standards and clinical studies were 
very expensive and increased the final price of the product. Slow industry growth and high 
exit costs were the only things to consider in the phytopharmaceutical market. The last 
threat was the great dependence on strategic business partners. Since Euromed sold its 
products business-to-business, a sustainable client network was key factor to consider. 
While changing their supplier was difficult for clients, losing them could be considered as 
even higher risk for Euromed (Roig, 2020). 
Euromed’s strategy leveraged its strengths for differentiation in high-quality, traceability, and 
credibility through clinical trials. These competitive advantages were especially valuable for 
the phytopharmaceutical industry. Thus, of the 35 countries Euromed exported to in 2015, the 
most strategically important hereby was Germany, as main region for phytopharmaceuticals. 
Given the growth opportunity in the natural supplements market, the USA, a flourishing center 
of the natural supplements market, was the second most important region. Even though 95% of 







USA was cheaper and easier to control. Therefore, Euromed only set up commercial offices in 
the rest of the countries and exported their products from their production centers in Europe 
and North America (Roig, 2020). 
 The Seller: Meda in 2015 
The value of a company can be different to the seller and to the buyer, and therefore so is the 
price (Martínez, 2012). To prepare a proper investment offer, it was important to understand 
the value of the company from the seller’s perspective to have an idea of how much the seller 
expects to receive. Additionally, there might be provisions, other than price, that the seller 
requires. This section sheds light on the ownership history, current owner and reasons for 
divestment. 
4.4.1. Ownership History 
Euromed was founded by the corporate parent Madaus in 1971. Madaus led the 
phytopharmaceutical market in Germany. The company was the first to isolate silymarin from 
the Milk Thistle seed used to treat hepatic insufficiency (liver failure). Euromed was created as 
a production center in Barcelona, with lower overhead costs than Germany, to vertically 
integrate the cultivation of silymarin, the API of Madaus’ key products.  By 1973 Euromed 
supplied other types of extracts, such as Saw Palmetto extracts. The main client was Madaus, 
but Euromed kept looking for more clients, particularly in Germany, Switzerland and France 
where the phytopharmaceuticals industry was strong. In the 70’s and 80’s Euromed focused on 
exports to European pharmaceuticals. However, in the 90’s there was a boom in the natural 
supplements market, specifically in the USA. Therefore, in 1995 Euromed opened a subsidiary 
in Pittsburgh, USA to manage the natural supplements industry. After this, Euromed exported 
to Asia, Australia and South America. In 2007 the Italian firm Rottapharm, leader in 
glucosamine products (Roig, 2020) used to treat conditions caused by the inflammation, 
breakdown and loss of cartilage in the joints (Mayo Clinic Staff, 2017), acquired Madaus. 
Euromed continued as a satellite under Rottapharm Madaus with growing sales. The new parent 
company invested up to €20 million in Euromed between 2007-2014. Finally, an IPO of 
Rottapharm Madaus failed in 2014 due to unfavorable market conditions leading to “a rapid 
change in the expectations of investors on European assets” (Bray, 2014). Sweden’s Meda AB 
stepped in and bought Rottapharm Madaus above market price (Roig, 2020) after the pulled 
IPO, as part of its strategy to create cost synergies (Griffin, 2014). 
4.4.2. Current Owner & Reason for Divestment 
Meda AB, a publicly listed company, operated as a specialty pharmaceutical firm with revenues 
of €2.140 million and over 4.000 employees in 2015 (Amadeus, 2020). The company 
manufactured and marketed pharmaceuticals, nutritional and health products (Bloomberg, n.d.). 
The products covered different therapeutic areas including dermatology, respiratory, 
gastroenterology, metabolism, pain and inflammation, among others (S&P Capital IQ, 2020b). 
Meda AB also offered services such as clinical research, registration and logistics (Bloomberg, 







selling and marketing prescription and over the counter pharmaceuticals. At the same time, it 
would increase their cash flow (Roig, 2020). Nonetheless, there were two key points that Meda 
AB required from the divestment. First, the company needed to secure Euromed as a long-term 
supplier for the API of their products with fixed prices. Second, as a publicly listed company, 
Meda AB required an attractive price offer to maintain their share value (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
The company was clear that they did not want a manager buyout (MBO) (Roig, 2020). An MBO 
consists of the management team buying the assets and operations of the business (Hargrave, 
2019). Thus, the company used Rothschild, an independent financial advisory group, as their 
assessor for the transaction (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
 The Buyer: Riverside in 2015 
To determine if the project (of investing in Euromed) fits Riverside’s strategy, the private equity 
firm’s operation, mission, structure and investment criteria are presented in this section. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the risks of the operation, plan for acquisition, and funding is 
detailed. Both risks analysis and plans for acquisition need to be quantified when making 
assumptions for financial forecast and valuation of the target company (Martínez, 2012). The 
type of funding presented in paragraph 4.5.5 also has an impact on the valuation analysis of the 
company. 
4.5.1. General Overview of Riverside in 2015 
The Riverside Company was founded in USA in 1988 with headquarters New York City. It 
operated as a private equity firm specializing in a wide range of investment strategies at the 
smaller end of the middle market companies in North America, Europe and Australasia (S&P 
Capital IQ, 2020c). Riverside stimulated sustainable growth through new products, expanding 
markets, operating improvements and add-on acquisitions. Areas in which Riverside invested 
ranged from technology, computer soft- & hardware, energy, telecommunication, industrial & 
consumer products, health & medical, up to consumer & industrial service and banking & 
finance (Capital-Riesgo.es, n.d.). The company preferred to work with sellers that would still 
be involved in the company to push growth. Riverside delivered a fair and fast process with 
successful results. Its mission was to create value (The Riverside Company, 2020b). Thus, they 
used as little leverage as possible to avoid creating financial distress on the target company. 
When they did use leverage, they did not pass the debt on to the target company (Álvarez-
Nóvoa, 2020). This is further explained in the funding section 4.5.5. 
The company had over 300 employees in 15 offices throughout North America, Europe, Asia 
and Australasia. Riverside Europe had one office in Madrid with five employees (The Riverside 
Company, 2020a). The Partner in the Madrid office, Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa, was responsible 
for the deal flow origination in Spain. He was experienced in identifying new investment 









Table 4: Fund’s Investment Criteria 
1. Target company value should be around €50-€250 million with EBITDA of €5-€25 
million. 
2. The target company must be a market leader. 
3. The target company must have a solid business model. A solid business model includes 
a good margin and competitive advantage. 
4. The target company must have a clear business development plan and growth potential. 
5. The target company must be international, with more that 60% of their sales on exports. 
6. The management team of the target company must be excellent. 
7. Exit option with at least 20-25% return. 
Source: Álvarez-Nóvoa (2020) 
Riverside’s objective was to invest in a company for 5 years to add value and make it grow in 
order to have a profitable exit (The Riverside Company, 2019). 
4.5.2. Risks of the Acquisition 
Considering the common objective to increase Euromed’s EBITDA, both companies faced 
three major risks in the upcoming shared time of the operation. First, accounting for 30% of 
total sales not only gave Meda AB strong bargaining power but made Euromed vulnerable if it 
lost Meda AB as a client. Furthermore, focus on the European market made Euromed highly 
dependent on few clients for growth and diversification. Second, the company’s focus on a 
mature pharma industry gave little room for growth. Limited product innovation in the pharma 
industry due to the long time to market stunted development. Third, Euromed was working at 
near maximum production capacity. This earlier mentioned bottleneck was a risk for 
spontaneous peaks in demand and could cause supply shortages. Lower service levels due to 
shortages could negatively influence customer satisfaction and lead to customer loss. Restricted 
production capabilities did not only limit increase of existing herbal extract, but also 
development of new herbal extracts to expand product portfolio for new markets (Álvarez-
Nóvoa, 2020). 
Both companies, Riverside as investor and Euromed as target, faced several risks when going 
into the agreement. Although the odds so far were high, it was still not confirmed that Riverside 
would win the bidding process. Resources invested in the elaboration of the letter of intent had 
to generally be considered as sunk costs (“money that has already been spent and which cannot 
be recovered” (Tuovila, 2019)) in the private equity business. Additionally, Riverside didn’t 
have complete knowledge of the production process of the target company. So, they had to trust 
in the employee’s know-how and operational recommendations. Another risk for Riverside was 
not achieving its goals in five years. The market could develop differently than expected and 
the desired growth not be achieved. However, the possibility for a bad development of the 
market was low due to the earlier mentioned market trends like increase in health awareness or 







in the private equity firm. It generally happened that new owners of a company want to dictate 
the operating business or even plan strategic changes like selling whole business units. But 
Riverside made clear in the negotiation process that they would not impose decisions on the 
core business and aim towards a sustainable growth of the company (Roig, 2020). 
4.5.3. Riverside’s Plans for Acquisition 
Riverside wanted to obtain sustainable sales growth of over 50% in five years (The Riverside 
Company, 2019) by focusing on the mayor risks of Euromed’s operation (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 
2020). In order to address these risks, Riverside planned to take the following actions: 
• Reduce the reliance on Meda AB sales by 50%, without reducing total sales (Álvarez-
Nóvoa, 2020): The purpose was not to sell less to Meda AB, but to accelerate the increase 
of sales with other pharmaceuticals and increase sales to the natural supplement industry 
globally. This would create customer diversification for Euromed. In order to accelerate 
sales with other clients, Riverside planned on hiring a Scientific Marketing Manager. This 
new role would add credibility to their sales team by focusing on clinical trials as proof of 
concept to differentiate Euromed from its competitors. Furthermore, they would push new 
sales in the USA to grow the share of natural supplements industry clients. Since this 
industry was less regulated, it would be easier to accelerate growth by reducing time to 
market of new products. Although nutraceuticals and natural supplements were less 
regulated, Euromed could capitalize on their product quality by branding their ingredients 
to create awareness, credibility and differentiation. The branding, such as a certified logo 
(indicating adherence to quality standards), would be provided to Euromed’s clients so that 
they could use it on their final product. They would also push sales to other clients in Asia 
and Australasia, especially in Japan, Korea and Australia (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). These 
actions would increase the size of the sale’s “pie” and consequently the dependence of sales 
to Meda AB would decrease. 
• Grow innovation for nutraceutical and natural supplements clients: Most of Euromed’s 
sales were focused on the mature and highly regulated pharmaceuticals industry. Thus, an 
opportunity to launch new products at a faster rate for nutraceutical clients could be 
exploited. This implied a change in work culture within Euromed. In 2015 the company’s 
work culture had a pharma-oriented mentality, only focusing on product improvement and 
developing at most one new product in two years. Riverside wanted to shift Euromed’s 
work culture to an innovative “scientific marketing” perspective (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020) of 
understanding how consumers spend their money on natural supplements, anticipate trends 
and provide a new solution. To keep up with consumer trends, an increase of up to three 
product launches a year was projected. Consequently, Riverside planned to create a new 
Product Development Committee, led by Carten Smith as chairman. Smith would bring 
over 25 years of experience to the team.  Riverside also planned to build an innovation 
center for R&D with an estimated investment of €2,5 million. The “scientific marketing” 
perspective would promote R&D (usually an activity done only by Euromed’s clients). For 







innovations and planned agreements with universities would give access to clinical studies  
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
• Increase production capacity: Riverside intended to incorporate an additional working shift 
in the production plant and replace an old drying machine that limited production with an 
investment of €2,3 million. (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). The new dryer would double the 
capacity to produce powder extracts (The Riverside Company, 2019). Riverside also 
planned to invest in an add-on acquisition of Probelte Biotecnología (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 
2020), a developer and manufacturer of ingredients used in natural supplements based in 
Murcia, Spain (S&P Capital IQ, 2020a). The add-on of Probelte would increase production 
of water-extracted products (an eco-friendly production method) and allow to produce new 
extracts. In total, it was expected to increase production by 25% (The Riverside Company, 
2019). 
4.5.4. Valuation Process 
As stated before, Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa’s first contact with Euromed took place in 2013, two 
years before the actual acquisition process. Although Euromed was not for sale at the time, the 
first contact was worthwhile since understanding the business is the first step before analyzing 
financial statements. Financial data reflects how the company operates (Martínez, 2012). This 
gave Riverside an advantage to really get to know Euromed’s operation in order to properly 
interpret financial data in time to present a well-rounded offer, if they decided to invest. The 
private equity firm used the DCF method with IRR and EBITDA multiples for business 
valuation. 
Being the most suitable method to valuate a company (Martínez, 2012), the DCF method gave 
Riverside valuable information about a possible price range for the target company and 
profitability. Using DCF, Riverside could quantify their restructuring plan (previously detailed 
in section 4.5.3) and the return on the investment by calculating internal rate of return (IRR). 
Calculating the IRR gives information about the profitability of a potential investment. The IRR 
is “the discount rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all cash flows from a particular 
project equal to zero” (Hayes, 2020a). The NPV is the “difference between the present value of 
cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time” (Kenton, 2020). 
Since Riverside’s objective was a profitable exit strategy, DCF must provide an IRR of at least 
25%. But, DCF required a lot of assumptions for accurate forecasting. Main drivers of 
profitability that required accurate assumptions were initial price paid, sales growth and 
increase margin/sales from restructuring plan and exit strategy (selling price in five years). 
Consequently, to develop precise future assumptions and estimate different scenarios it was 
essential to understand Euromed’s business and market dynamics well. Furthermore, even if 
Riverside studied Euromed’s business for two years, uncertainties in combination of 
assumptions, such as sales growth and operational expenses, to create a forecast could create 
false expectations. Therefore, DCF was not Riverside’s preferred valuation method if used 
alone (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Consequently, DCF was just one part of the valuation process. It 







Valuation based on multiples, on the other hand, is used to calculate a company’s value and 
compare it with other companies (Corporate Finance Institute, 2019b). Riverside used EBITDA 
multiples to value Euromed, which is the “most used enterprise value multiple; computed as 
the proportion of Enterprise Value to [EBITDA]” (Corporate Finance Institute, 2019b). In 
contrast to the DCF method, a business valuation based on EBITDA multiples uses only data 
of a specific date (in this case Euromed’s EBITDA in 2015) and multiplies it with a reasonable 
multiple calculated from available information about other market players. Generating a table 
of comparable companies to calculate Euromed’s company value with the right EBITDA 
multiple was quite challenging for Riverside. Euromed operated in a market niche. Thus, it was 
hard to find accessible information about comparable firms. However, Riverside was able to 
generate a table of comparable publicly listed competitors with their EV’s and EBITDA’s (see 
Annex L). Comparable companies were located all around the world but worked in the same 
industry as Euromed. Due to their publicly listed company status, all comparable competitors 
were bigger than Riverside’s target company. By dividing the EV’s by each respective EBITDA 
a multiple was calculated for each comparable firm. The average EBITDA multiple could have 
been used as orientation for a reasonable multiple to compute Euromed’s value in 2015 but 
publicly listed companies were too big in value to use as reference. Thus, information about 
former market transactions (also see Annex L) gave insight about possible realistic values for 
the multiple (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
4.5.5. Funding 
The structure used by the private equity firm to fund this investment would be a simple 
leveraged buyout using both equity and debt. It would be divided into 50% equity and 50% debt 
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Due to the costly planned investment in capital expenses (capex) and 
required working capital (WC), Riverside could have used a bullet loan as debt fund. This type 
of loan schedules a one-time payment of the lump sum agreed in the contract at the end of the 
term. In such loans the borrowers often “have the option to make no payments over the life of 
the loan or to make interest-only payments along the way” (Kagan, 2019). Bullet loans usually 
have higher interest rates than other funding options due to less regular cash flow to the lender. 
In exchange, banks allow borrowers to have more flexibility to begin expensive projects 
immediately and adapt the duration of the loan based on the project time expectations (Kagan, 
2019). Even though the company’s management team had participations in Euromed, Riverside 
would buy 100% of the target in order to have total control for the restructuring plan. Payment 
would be made in cash, as required by the seller (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
When buying the target company, Riverside would not pass the debt on directly to the target 
company. A new company would be created as special purpose vehicle (SPV) to secure both 
the buying as well as target company (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). A SPV is a subsidiary of the 
buyer to isolate assets, keep transactions structured and thus decrease the financial risk for all 
parties involved. Due to its legal status as new company, this subsidiary can continue operating 









There are several steps that needed to be followed to determine if the target company in this 
case should be acquired by Riverside. This case provides the opportunity to refine business 
judgement for decision-making in private equity investment as a learning tool by developing 
business skills used in the following steps adapted from Martínez Abascal (2012): 
• Examination of strategic fit with Riverside’s criteria for investment, 
• P&L and Balance Sheet analysis to determine if the company is profitable and identify 
risks and problems (if any) to solve, 
• Forecast analysis, including Riversides contribution, to determine if the investment would 
be profitable, 
• Calculation of profit at time of exit based on acquisition price using DCF and multiples, 
• Risk analysis (sensitivity analysis) to quantify investment lost given a worst-case scenario. 
This section covers all five steps adapted to the specific case of Riverside’s decision process to 
invest in Euromed. The strategic fit and the historic P&L and Balance Sheet were analyzed 
before defining assumptions about the future and analyzing the profitability as well as risk of 
the investment. Finally, a reasonable decision about the investment was suggested. 
 Strategic Fit 
This case shows that there is more to decision-making in private equity investment than just a 
comparison of valuation of the company and the price paid for the company. The first thing that 
the private equity must consider is if the acquisition meets the investment criteria. Table 5 
provides Riverside’s investment criteria and justifies Euromed’s strategic fit. 





1. Target company value should be 
around €50-€250 million with 
EBITDA of €5-€25 million. 
The value of Euromed using 
EBITDA multiple of 8 (base 
scenario) was about €74 million 
with EBITDA of €9 million. 
Yes 
2. The target company must be a market 
leader. 
Euromed was herbal ingredients 
market leader. 
Yes 
3. The target company must have a solid 
business model. A solid business model 
includes a good margin and 
competitive advantage. 
Given its high-quality product, 
margin was at above 50%. The 
combination of traceability, 
quality and clinical studies for 
proof of concept gave Euromed a 









4. The target company must have a clear 
business development plan and growth 
potential. 
There was high growth potential in 
new regions like the USA, existing 
markets with other 
phytopharmaceutical companies 
and in natural supplements 
category. 
Yes 
5. The target company must be 
international, with more that 60% of 
their sales on exports. 
95% of Euromed’s sales were 
outside of Spain. Yes 
6. The management team of the target 
company must be excellent. 
There was a very low turnover in 
Euromed’s management team. 
Many of the employees worked 
over 30 years in Euromed with 
“deep industry expertise and know 
how” (The Riverside Company, 
2019). Xavier Roig had been 
working with the company since 
its foundation and was still very 
committed. 
Yes 
7. Exit option with at least 20-25% return The DCF analysis showed a 
potential IRR of 5% in a worst-
case scenario, below the minimum 
acceptable return. 
No 
Source: adapted from Álvarez-Nóvoa (2020) 
The analysis shows that Euromed was a good fit with Riverside’s investment criteria. Strictly 
speaking, a worst-case scenario would go against the funds exit option. However, our base 
scenario was very conservative and resulted in an acceptable IRR. Furthermore, Riverside’s 
structuring plan was aimed at limiting risk factors for a worst case scenario as discussed in 
section 5.6 on risk analysis. 
 Historic P&L and Balance Sheet Analysis 
As mentioned in the case, the first step in an investment decision is to understand the business. 
The purpose of understanding a business is to make a judgement on the quality of the company 
evaluated for purchase (Martínez, 2012). Through due diligence, Riverside obtained and 
verified information on business operation and financial data. An analysis of Euromed’s 
financial data without understanding the business would be purely theoretical and thus could 
lead to incorrect conclusions (Martínez, 2012). Accordingly, the following P&L and Balance 
Sheet analysis were conducted after completely understanding Euromed’s business in order to 








5.2.1. P&L Analysis 
The objective of a P&L analysis was to determine if Euromed made money (i.e. if it generated 
revenue) and if it was profitable. If the analysis was positive, then we could continue with the 
valuation process. As a rule of thumb, the smaller number of items in a P&L, the easier the 
analysis (Martínez, 2012). See Annex C for the “big” numbers considered for this analysis. The 
“big” numbers are the items that allow to identify problems (if any) and solve them (Martínez, 
2012). For definition of main items presented in Euromed’s P&L, please see Annex F. We 
concentrated on relevant items to give a diagnostic on quality of the business and an action plan 
for the forecast. The concept, value and trends were analyzed to draw up opinions and 
conclusions where possible: 
• Sales: Revenue closed at almost €43 million for 2015 with average growth of 7% in the 
last five years. The sales growth decreased from 12% in 2011 to 7% in 2014 but stabilized 
in the last two years, remaining constant at 7% growth in 2014 and 2015. The 
biotechnology industry was projected to decline in growth as it matured after 2014. Thus, 
Euromed followed the industry trend. The company did not exceed expectations in sales, 
so sales growths were neutral (neither good nor bad). Nonetheless, there was high potential 
to grow sales by exploiting nutraceutical and natural supplements market with new product 
launches. 
• Margin: The average margin in the last five years was 56%. The margin was very stable 
and guaranteed by the pharma industry (buyers had high barriers to switch suppliers and 
moderate bargaining power). It decreased mildly from 57% in 2011 to 55% in 2015. 
Decrease in margin was due to increased changes of inventories of finished goods, which 
impacts the cost of goods sold (COGS). This was expected given the seasonality of raw 
material required for Euromed’s production. Increased sales with a moderate decrease in 
margin gave a positive outlook. Price controls and checks on suppliers could help reduce 
COGS. 
• Operating costs (Opex): Euromed’s Opex represented 33% of sales, down from 37% in 
2011. By 2015 it was around €14 million. A decrease in Opex while increasing sales is a 
positive indicator. Increase in COGS was compensated by the reduction of Opex. 
Operating income increased from €7 million in 2011 to €9 million in 2015. Over the last 
five years it maintained a 20%-21% EBITDA over sales ratio. Also, a good indicator. 
• Profitability: Net income duplicated from €4 million in 2011 to €8 million in 2015. 
However, this was positively impacted by €4 million in extraordinary items from the sale 
of patents to its previous owner, Meda AB (Sabi, 2020). Return on sales (ROS) is calculated 
by dividing net income by sales of the same year. ROS increased significantly from 12% 
in 2011 to 19% in 2015. An increase in ROS means that sales growth is managed 
effectively to cover companies’ expenses (Hayes, 2020b). Thus, Euromed is growing 
efficiently. Return on equity (ROE) on the other hand indicates how effectively 
management uses assets to turn them into profit (Hargrave, 2020b). ROE is calculated by 







high compared to the S&P 500 long-term average of 14% (Hargrave, 2020b). Thus, 
Euromed’s profitability was very attractive. 
• Risk sensitivity analysis: Net income represented 19% of sales in 2015. Calculating the 
difference between gross margin as a percentage of sales in 2015 and net income over sales 
of the same year, provided the threshold at which profit would disappear. This meant that 
if margin reduced from 55% to 35%, there would be no profit for Euromed. A possible 
situation under this scenario meant that sales reduced significantly, resulting in reduced 
prices and at the same time increased COGS. Nonetheless, the risk that margin would be 
reduced by 20% was limited, even in a worst-case scenario. 
Euromed had growing sales, good margin, growing net income and excellent ROE. Good 
margin is key for efficient growth. Even with growing profitability, Riverside’s intention was 
to accelerate profitability during its 5-year investment. With Euromed’s positive performance 
up to 2015 from the P&L analysis, in a maturing industry, an investment and strategic plan to 
speed up growth looked promising. Next we analyzed the balance sheet. 
5.2.2. Balance Sheet Analysis 
The main reason behind a Balance Sheet analysis was to examine the financial evolution of the 
company and determine its profitability, similar to the P&L analysis. But instead of comparing 
revenue with expenses (as the P&L analysis does) the Balance Sheet analysis helps analyze the 
assets and liabilities of the company (Martínez, 2012). Like the P&L analysis, we focused on 
the “big” numbers on the Balance Sheet to identify its key items, identify problems (if any) and 
solve them. While Annex D illustrates Euromed’s Balance Sheet from 2011 to 2015, Annex G 
defines the main items to consider. For the detailed analysis we transformed all relevant data 
into the short Balance Sheet, presented in Annex E. The short Balance Sheet consists of net 
assets part, formed by the need of funds for operations of a company and fixed assets, and the 
financing part, formed by equity, provisions and other liabilities and debt. The last item of the 
short Balance Sheet is cash, which is produced (or needed) by the company over the analyzed 
years (Martínez, 2012). 
• Need of funds for operations (NFO): Almost all investment in needed fund for operations 
was stock inventory with an average NFO share of 90% from 2011 to 2015. Such a high 
amount of inventory lowered Euromed’s risk of shortages and customers got products 
when required, which increased customer satisfaction. However, high inventory 
automatically stands for high storage (and often insurance) costs and increased the risk of 
loss of high amount of products during an incident such as fire or theft (Leonard, 2019). 
The stable proportion of stock inventory in NFO over the last five years as well as 
continuous low payables to suppliers and other current liabilities indicated a good 
management of NFO. The only item with a high increase of 90% from 2011 to 2012 was 
receivables. This was a sign of a change in Euromed’s payment terms with customers 
(Sagarra, 2019). Receivables continued stable (with little variation) from 2012 to 2015 at 







a decrease of the payment period from 35 days in 2011 to 25 days in 2015. Average ratio 
of the last five years was 64%. 
• Fixed assets (FA): Fixed assets increased about 23% from 2011 to 2013. This increase in 
FA represents the replacement of an extraction plant from 1979 to increase in-house 
production instead of outsourcing. Afterwards, from 2013 to 2015, these fixed assets 
decreased again about 20%. 
• Net assets (NA): Since net assets are the sum of NFO and FA, they also increased from 
2011 to 2013. Afterwards, they stayed relatively constant at around €40 million. NFO 
accounted for a little less than two thirds of NA during the analyzed period. NFO 
accounting for a bigger share of NA is common for most companies (Martínez, 2012). 
While there is no financial mismanagement, an increase of NA usually stands for increasing 
sales and a growing company (Sagarra, 2019), as in the case of Euromed. 
• Equity (E): There was a logarithmic increase in equity during the last five years. Euromed’s 
capital only made around 15% of the equity and stayed fixed at €5,4 million. Other 
shareholders funds (accounting for 85% of equity) leveled off from a 9% increase from 
2011 to 2012 to 1% increase from 2014 to 2015. Increasing equity was a good sign for the 
company. 
• Provisions & other liabilities: Provisions and other non-current liabilities amounted to no 
more than €1,4 million (€1,1 million on average) in the analyzed time period. No 
abnormalities were detected. 
• Debt (D): Debt changed drastically from 0 in 2011 to its maximum value of almost €2,5 
million in 2013. Subsequently, it slightly decreased to €1,8 million in 2015. This meant 
that Euromed needed (apart from the increasing equity) more funds to finance the 
increasing NA. However, the decrease in recent years (2014-2015) showed the company 
could repay this debt. 
• Financing: The three earlier mentioned elements (equity, provisions and other liabilities 
and debt) form Euromed’s financing, the funding available to finance NFO and FA 
(Sagarra, 2019). Due to the increasing equity from 2011 to 2014 and the sudden increase 
of debt in 2013, Euromed’s financing grew rapidly in the beginning (10% in 2012 and 12% 
in 2013) and stabilized at around €43 million from 2013 on. 
• Cash: Since the value of Euromed’s financing side was greater than its asset side in all the 
analyzed years, the company generated money. Euromed ended the year of 2011 with a 
cash surplus of over €3 million. In both years 2012 and 2013 NA increased faster than 
financing, resulting in a decrease of the cash generated in both years (compared to the 
previous one respectively). Hardly any change of NA in 2014 and its decrease in 2015 as 
well as little increase of financing in both years let the amount of cash generated increase 
again. The average amount of cash during the last five years was €2,5 million, with an 







• Risk sensitivity analysis: Comparing the last two years of Euromed’s short Balance Sheet 
there was little decrease in the company’s net assets and increase in financing. This was a 
sign for raising the sources of funds (Sagarra, 2019). Additionally, while there was only 
little change in receivables and payables, inventory grew continuously. This was the only 
risk detected in the Balance Sheet. The very high proportion of stocks in NFO (90%) were 
risky because such an excess inventory ties up cash; its stable character stands for a long 
inventory turnover. In 2015, inventory turnover accounted for 225 days of inventory. This 
could be improved by a better inventory management. Collection period was 45 days, 
payment period 25 days. Although it took Euromed more time to receive money from 
customers than paying its suppliers, due to high liquidity both metrics can be considered 
acceptable and don’t show signs for any risk. The leverage ratio (liabilities divided by 
equity (Sagarra, 2019)) was with 21% in 2015 rather low. 
Summing up, it can be said that Euromed’s Balance Sheet of the last five years also looked 
promising. While both net assets as well as financing increased during the time from 2011 to 
2015, Euromed managed to generate cash in each year. The only abnormality detected, which 
could turn out risky for the future, was the high amount of inventory, resulting in a high 
inventory turnover. This was considered when making the company’s forecast. 
5.2.3. Business Analysis and Risks 
Based on our analysis, the key of herbal extracts business was R&D investment, quality 
assurance, and credibility (proof of concept). Euromed’s supply chain already guaranteed 
traceability and high-quality standards. Its long trajectory and clinical studies gave it credibility. 
Thus, there was no risk with quality assurance and credibility. Euromed’s R&D had been 
successful with the pharma industry, but more R&D was needed to further penetrate the natural 
supplements market. 
Herbal ingredients were gaining more strength as both pharma clients and end consumers were 
looking for more traditional products as detailed in section 4.2. So, synthetic substitutes were a 
weak threat. Furthermore, given high barriers for pharma clients to change suppliers and 
Euromed’s high quality, competitors were also a weak risk. Product prices and order quantities 
were secured by Euromed’s high quality, required by their clients. Additionally, the ingredients 
represented a small percentage of their client’s final product cost. Nonetheless, there was an 
unexploited market in natural supplements that required higher investment in R&D and 
production capacity. Finally, dependence on inventory to ensure supply could result in higher 
risk of damages and loss. 
To conclude, Euromed had a high-quality product with a low cost to their client but crucial for 
the final product certification and success. The company was profitable with a strong 
competitive advantage and had good margins. However, investment in R&D and increase 
production capacity was required to maximize growth potential. So, through some 









 Forecast Analysis 
After the P&L and Balance Sheet analysis, we were able to understand what type of business 
(including quality) was for purchase. We also concluded that the reason for purchase was to 
improve future cash flows through the plan for acquisition detailed in section 4.5.3. The plan 
for acquisition was reflected numerically on the main assumptions for the P&L and Balance 
Sheet forecast (see Annex H and Annex I). To develop the forecast, we drew from the following 
assumptions: 
• Initial price paid: The hypothesis of €80 million as initial price paid was used to develop 
the forecast. The price was determined using EV/EBITDA multiple between the ranges of 
7,0x to 9,0x. Given the quality of the business as previously analyzed, we estimate that a 
value between €70 million to €95 million was realistic. Further analysis on EBITDA 
multiple valuation is presented in section 5.4.1. 
• Equity invested: Equivalent to 50% of the amount paid (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020), as 
described in section 4.5.5. The purpose was not to overload the target company with debt 
and avoid financial strain after the exit strategy. 
• Debt: As little burden as possible placed on Euromed was projected, using a bullet loan. 
This would allow the use of cash for Capex, needed for Riverside’s acquisition plan 
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
The forecast analysis had three main purposes. First objective was to determine if the improved 
company would make money at a profit for Riverside. Second objective was to define if there 
was a manageable debt balance. Third, this analysis concluded if by the end of the investment 
income and debt were similar to the values before the purchase (Martínez, 2012). 
Under the assumption that the purchase was done using a new company as explained in section 
4.5.5, the analysis was executed individually for Euromed (without considering combination 
with the acquiring company). In the forecast analysis, we reviewed the company that Riverside 
wanted to create with its investment. 
5.3.1. P&L Forecast Analysis 
It is better to be conservative, or even pessimist in the assumptions used for the forecast 
(Martínez, 2012) due to uncertainty of expectations. With Euromed’s previous performance as 
a starting point, assumptions based on Riverside’s investment plan and market trends were 
applied to create the forecast (see Annex J). We followed the same steps used to analyze 
Euromed’s P&L from 2011-2015. Below are our observations and opinions drawn from the 
P&L forecast analysis: 
• A 10% sales growth from 2015-2020 was estimated based on Riverside’s investments to 
diversify and grow client portfolio. Yearly growth rate was projected 3% higher than if 
Euromed continued to operate as it did in the past. Total assumed growth during the 5-year 
investment was 61%. The assumption was not as optimistic as it would be only considering 
Riverside’s improvement plan, because industry sales growth, projected to decrease (but 







• An attractive supply agreement with Meda AB was crucial to close negotiations on the 
purchase. In order to achieve competitive prices for the supply agreement, we anticipated 
4% of the margin would be sacrificed. However, margin would go back to 55% at the end 
of the 5-year investment by applying strict pricing tools with Euromed’s suppliers, new 
product launches and diversifying client portfolio. 
• To push sales and open new markets, a focus on R&D was needed. This new focus came 
with new hires, including an R&D committee and a Scientific Marketing Manager. 
Consequently, it was expected that Opex would increase from 4% to 7% a year during 
Riverside’s investment. The assumption was that the increase in Opex would contribute to 
increase in sales; increasing R&D would increase product launches and therefore sales. 
The percentage of Opex over sales would slowly decrease from 32% in 2016 to 29% in 
2020. This was a positive outlook. 
• Finally, through all these actions, Euromed’s EBITDA would likely increase by 97% at the 
time of exit from the investment. EBITDA increase was mainly due to increase in sales and 
controlled growth of COGS and margin. This would be favorable for an EBITDA multiple 
valuation at the time of exit. Additionally, ROS and ROE are a function of net income. The 
net income of Euromed in 2015 was positively impacted by €4 million in extraordinary 
items, identified in section 0, increasing ROS and ROE for that year. Extraordinary items 
are infrequent, unusual and are not part of the company’s ordinary operation, and therefore 
performance (Fuhrmann, 2019). If we did not include extraordinary items for 2015, net 
income was lowered, and so was ROS and ROE. See  
• Table 6 below for evolution of ROS and ROE with and without extraordinary items. To 
make a better judgement on ROS and ROE at the end of the investment, we compared with 
ROS and ROE in 2015, without considering extraordinary items. Both ROS and ROE 
increased significantly in the forecast, indicating an efficient growth and use of assets to 
create profit. 











      Year 
Ratios 
2015 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
ROS 19% 10% 8% 10% 12% 14% 15% 
ROE 20% 10% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
Source: own elaboration 
To conclude, by the time Riverside exited this investment, Euromed would be very profitable, 








5.3.2. Balance Sheet Forecast Analysis 
To generate Euromed’s Balance Sheet forecast, the company’s historic Balance Sheet, as well 
as Riverside’s plan for acquisition presented in section 4.5.3 were taken into account. Annex I 
justifies all assumptions applied to the forecast illustrated in Annex K. To analyze the Balance 
Sheet forecast from 2016 to 2020, the same “big” numbers from the short Balance Sheet in 
section 5.2.2 have been studied. The following results were detected: 
• Although Riverside planned to decrease Euromed’s inventory level, NFO was assumed to 
stay fix at 64% of total sales. This was a conservative assumption and reflects a 
compensation of the inventory improvement with the extension of the payment period. Due 
to the sales growth assumption of 10%, NFO increases equal to sales, about 61% total in 
the time of the investment. Although the ratio of NFO over sales is not expected to 
decrease, considering the past five years, this is an acceptable outlook. 
• Fixed assets were projected to increase about 44% from 2015 to 2020. With the objective 
of increasing sales, the company had to make several investments. The plan of a new 
innovation center as well as the purchase of new machinery explained the growth of fixed 
assets. With an increase of only 44% in fixed assets in 5 years, a sales growth of 61% of 
total sales within the same time period indicated an effective management strategy for that 
line in the balance sheet. 
• Goodwill represented 51% of NA at €40,3 million. This meant, price paid was more than 
the adjusted book value of equity. Euromed’s market leadership, high-quality standards in 
the production process and the industry EBITDA multiple justified the value of the target 
company. Furthermore, with operational improvements during investment years, a high 
return on investment was expected. As it is prohibited since 2001 by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to amortize goodwill, and only permitted in some 
exceptional cases (Investopedia, 2019), we predicted it would stay fix over the years. This 
was an acceptable conservative assumption. 
• Due to a fast growth of net income between 2016 and 2020, Euromed’s equity was expected 
to grow from €40 million in 2015 (post sale) to over €75 million in 2020, an increase of 
88%. For the purpose of this forecast, equity only increased with the net income of each 
current year respectively (shareholders were not expected to add capital). Thus, this high 
growth was a very good sign and reflected the company’s ability to finance a high 
proportion of net assets with its own capital. 
• Short-term debt was assumed to cover 100% of NFO, in order to maximize cash flow for 
shareholders and increase IRR So, it grew 61% in total, equal to NFO and sales. The great 
increase of NFO to almost €44 million meant a great sum of assets needed to be financed 
with short-term debt. However, with a share of 33% of the total financing part (compared 
to 57% equity) this amount of STD placed less financial burden on Euromed. 
Since we assumed to balance missing financing with long-term debt in form of a bullet 
loan, this part of debt stayed constant at €11,8 million for all five years. With only 15% of 







STD with 34% or equity with 50%. Since both equity as well as STD increased, the 
proportion of LTD in the total financing part decreased to 9% in 2020, which was a positive 
outlook. 
Total debt increased heavily in 2015 after the sale to finance the increase of net assets due 
to goodwill. Over the time of the investment total debt was assumed to grow about 43%. 
However, while total debt made almost 50% of financing in 2015, it was expected to only 
account for 42% of financing in 2020. This decrease of the share of total debt in financing 
was a positive sign for a manageable debt balance, reducing financial risk. It showed less 
dependence of Euromed on external fund from banks or other lenders. 
• We assumed financing equaled net assets in 2015 after the sale. So, the cash account at the 
beginning of the project summed zero. NA were expected to grow about 28% from €80 
million in 2015 (post sale) to €102,2 million in 2020. In contrast, financing would grow 
65% total, from €80 million in 2015 to almost €132 million in 2020, based on forecast 
assumptions. With financing growing faster than net assets, the company was expected to 
generate cash in each year of the investment. Given the slightly exponential growth of 
financing and the rather linear growth of net assets, the expected cash generated per year 
increased from €2,8 million in 2016 to over €9,4 million in 2020. 
Compared to the previous five years it was therefore estimated that Euromed’s operations 
would be very profitable and that the company, with support from Riverside, would be able to 
establish a sustainable growth. 
 Profitability Analysis 
The forecast analyses gave insight on whether the restructured version of Euromed would be 
profitable. The next step was to quantify how much money a five-year investment in Euromed 
would make for Riverside at the time of exit. In order to analyze profitability, we had to 
determine the price to pay for the required return on investment. This analysis included multiple 
valuation, DCF valuation from the buyer and seller perspectives, IRR analysis and closing 
negotiations. 
5.4.1. Valuation with EBITDA multiple 
There were no clear comparable companies, given the different operation combinations, 
profitability and sizes of companies in the natural extracts business, but Álvarez-Nóvoa (2020) 
had references based on recent acquisition transactions of natural extracts companies used to 
determine a reasonable EBITDA multiple. A summary of comparable companies and multiples 
is in Annex L. The total average for comparable companies EV/EBITDA multiple in 2015 was 
8,2x. In order to have a price range for negotiation, price valuation was conducted with 
multiples between 7,0x and 9,0x. Valuation using three multiple options was calculated as 
indicated in methodology section 3.2. See Table 7 for outcomes. 


















Source: own elaboration 
Given Euromed’s quality, a price range between €70 and €80 million seemed reasonable. 
However, we needed to evaluate our return with these price ranges before determining our final 
price recommendation. 
5.4.2. DCF Valuation and expected IRR 
In order to reduce the risk of focusing on just one valuation method and thus, going into price 
negotiations with a possibly biased idea of the final price, we additionally calculated Euromed’s 
company value with the DCF valuation method introduced in section 4.5.4. Each respective 
cash flow for shareholders (CFshare) for each year was calculated as explained in section 3.2. 
The cash outflow due to expected increase in NA, from €80 million in 2015 (post sale) to over 
€102 million in 2020, was offset by predicted cash inflow from increased debt and net income. 
In the first project year, the company’s debt was expected to grow about €2,8 million. This 
positive variation of debt increases annually around €0,3 million, resulting in a debt increase of 
€4,0 million between 2019 and 2020. Additionally, the slightly exponential growth of a positive 
net income over the five years contributed to increased cash flow for shareholders. Thus, CFshare 
was positive for all years of investment 
At the end of the project we assumed the company would be sold using the same EBITDA 
multiple of 8,0x as in 2015; we didn’t expect many new transactions of natural extracts 
companies’ acquisition that would change the multiple. Considering the market expansion to 
the fast-growing natural supplement industry, this assumption was rather conservative. It is 
better to receive positive cash flows right from the start than cash flows close to zero in the 
beginning and a big cash flow at the end of the project (Martínez, 2012). In the case of Euromed, 
although we would have a great cash flow in 2020 due to the sale of the company, it was 
expected to generate positive cash flows for shareholders since the beginning. Annex M 
illustrates the calculated cash flows and resulting metrics (NPV and IRR) to analyze the projects 
profitability. 
The calculated IRR of almost 33% and NPV of €12,4 million in the base scenario were positive 
signs for the profitability of the project. If we kept the assumption of a 50% equity, 50% debt 
project funding, the maximum acceptable price would be €95 million, resulting in an IRR of 
25,35%, slightly above the minimum required by Riverside. Thus, any price under €95 million 
should be considered acceptable. We therefore widened our price range and propose a price 







5.4.3. Value for the Seller 
As part of preparation for the negotiation process, it was convenient to have an idea of the target 
company’s value for the seller. Nonetheless, the value of the company might not be the same 
as the asking price (Martínez, 2012). In order to calculate the value of the company for the 
seller, we assumed that Euromed continued operating as it had in the past. 
Based on financial statements up to 2015, we assumed that sales would continue to grow at 7%, 
as it had for the last two years. We also assumed that the margin would remain unchanged and 
Opex would continue as 4% of total sales. The valuation was under the assumption that the 
seller would invest the same amount on fixed assets as the annual amount they depreciate. We 
did not know the return required by the seller but expected it to be less than the 25% that 
Riverside required. Thus, we worked with an assumption of a required 15% return. This is an 
arbitrary number (it is whatever the investor finds reasonable (Martínez, 2012)). We used a 
15% required return considering the following points of reference by Martínez Abascal (2012): 
• Historic return of stock market (S&P500, DAX, IBEX) was around 10% in developed 
countries. 
• Usually private companies required a 5% higher return than publicly listed companies. 
Based on these assumptions that the seller would not improve Euromed, we calculated CFshare 
and present value (PV) of Euromed with a result for PV of €58,8 million (see Annex N). 
However, it was likely that the seller perceived less risk in their own operation and had more 
optimistic assumptions. Furthermore, it was also likely that their required return was less than 
we assumed. Therefore, more optimistic assumptions and lower required return would mean a 
higher value for the seller (Martínez, 2012). For example, a required return of 12% would result 
in a €66 million value and a 10% return gave a €71,7 million value. 
 Negotiation 
This case study provided little room for negotiation since it was a sealed bid auction. 
Nonetheless, negotiations after the LOI can take place to determine final agreements in 
contracts. To close the transaction, we determined our recommended negotiation for this case 
study and the ZOPA based on seller’s valuation. Key aspects we defined for recommended 
negation were: 
• Buyer’s walk away point: As mentioned before, the maximum acceptable price suggested 
for Riverside was €95 million, which resulted in an IRR of 25,35%. This can be considered 
as the walkaway point. Anything above would be too costly and not bring the desired 
return. 
• Initial price (anchor): Based on the calculated price range between €70 and €95 million and 
the calculated seller’s value of at least around €60 million, we would suggest a bid of €70 
million as anchor price for Euromed in the first offer. While this offer would be above 
seller’s value, it is the minimum reasonable price with a low EBITDA multiple. Riverside 







increase chances for winning the auction process. If Meda AB accepted the anchor price 
of €70 million, it would result in a great return for Riverside (about 38,5% IRR). 
• Seller’s walk away point: As described in the previous section 5.4.3, conservative 
assumptions from seller’s side and the average required return of 15% would result in a PV 
of almost €60 million. However, we assumed the seller’s minimum acceptable price to be 
higher, between €65 and €70 million. The seller might not consider any buyer offering a 
price below this walk away point. 
• Aspiration value (our objective): Since our proposed price ranges from €70 to €95 million 
and we assumed the seller would push the price higher in order to gain more money from 
the transaction, our aspiration value was €80 million. With this price, both the seller and 
the buyer would be satisfied. This value would be around €10 to €15 million higher than 
the seller’s walk away point. So, this would be a good deal for the seller. On the other side, 
Riverside would still pay €15 million less than its maximum acceptable price, generating 
an expected IRR for the investment’s base scenario of 33%, eight percentage points above 
the required IRR. 
 Risk Analysis 
Risk is any variability in investor’s profit due to changes in expected cash flow (Martínez, 
2012). To evaluate risk for the investor, we first identified risk factors and then we quantified 
them. All our hypothesis for assumptions were risk factors. We focused on sales growth, margin 
and Opex for the risk analysis, as they had direct impact on the company’s profitability. By 
quantifying risk, we could determine how sensible IRR and NPV were to variations in these 
risk factors. First, we determined ranges considering a worst-case scenario and a best-case 
scenario for sales growth, margin and Opex, as detailed in Annex H. Then, we calculated the 
IRR and NPV for each range individually. By only changing one variable at a time, and keeping 
all others constant, we could determine which variable had the greatest impact on profitability 








Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis (all other things equal) 
IRR and NPV for different sales growth rates 
Variable Worst Base Best Range 
g Sales, annual 8% 10% 12%  
IRR 25% 33% 40% 15% 
NPV (thousands $) 46 12,389 25,535 25,489 
IRR and NPV for different increases of gross margin 
Variable Worst Base Best Range 
g Margin 0% 1% 2%  
IRR shareholder 26% 33% 38% 12% 
NPV (thousands $) 1,726 12,389 23,053 21,327 
IRR and NPV for different increases of Opex 
Variable Worst Base Best Range 
g Opex 9% 7% 5%  
IRR shareholder 28% 33% 37% 9% 
NPV (thousands $) 4,297 12,389 19,976 15,679 
IRR and NPV for different EBITDA Multiples at exit 
Variable Worst Base Best Range 
Multiple 7 8 9  
IRR shareholder 29% 33% 36% 7% 
NPV (thousands $) 6,533 12,389 18,246 11,713 
Source: own elaboration 
The sensitivity analysis applied to each variable individually allowed us to measure the degree 
of uncertainty and impact that each variable had on expected profitability (Martínez, 2012). The 
greater the range between the worst-case and best-case scenario, the higher uncertainty of the 
profitability that can be reached. Thus, the result of the sensitivity analysis showed that sales 
growth created the greatest uncertainty on expected profitability, followed by growth in margin 
and then by growth in Opex. The multiple used for the exit strategy generated the least 
uncertainty on potential profitability. On the other hand, value added or reduced with a 
percentage point increase showed the impact of the variable on profitability. One percentage 
point (pp) increase of sales growth per year added €6,3 million of value. Margin growth had 
the greatest impact per pp change, with an added €10,6 million of value for each pp increase. 
On the other hand, one pp increase of Opex decreased value by €3,9 million. Finally, an increase 
of one digit in the selling multiple added €5,86 million of value. Thus, results showed that to 








We cannot assure that everything will not go wrong in the future. So, as investors, we should 
always prepare for the worst. In order to prepare for the worst, we performed a worst-case 
scenario sensitivity analysis. Our worst-case analysis assumed that everything went wrong with 
sales growth, margin and Opex at the same time (see Table 8 for worst case scenario of each 
variable). In a worst-case scenario, Riverside could get an IRR of almost 5%. Yet, Riverside’s 
restructuring plan limited the risks for a pessimistic outcome in sales, margin and Opex growth. 
Given the controlled risk, we would recommend the acquisition of Euromed. 
 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this work was to develop a real-world case study that analyzed if a private 
equity acquisition in the middle market fit the strategy of the fund to create sustainable growth. 
We therefore developed and analyzed the case of Riverside’s investment in Euromed using both 
qualitative as well as quantitative methods. During the qualitative phase we conducted primary 
research by interviewing the CEO of the target company, Xavier Roig and the acquiring 
company’s transaction team leader in Spain, Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa. Secondary research on the 
internet was done to complement information obtained from the interview. The quantitative 
phase consisted in analyzing financial statements of the five years prior to the case to create a 
P&L and Balance Sheet forecast for the five-year investment period. We then used two 
valuation methods, DCF using CFshare and EBITDA multiple, to determine the price range for 
the desired return of investment and measure risk. The case study will serve as a learning tool 
to improve business judgement and skills required for a private equity investment decision 
making process in the middle market using LBO for sustainable growth. Through the 
development of this case study we drew three main conclusions that will serve as learning 
points, discussed in the following paragraphs. 
First, based on our analyses results of Euromed’s strategic fit with Riverside’s criteria for 
investment, Euromed’s profitability and risk prior and post investment, we would invest in 
Euromed if we were Riverside. The investment decision process is not just about profitability. 
Euromed met most of Riverside’s criteria for an investment which included company value, 
international presence, strong business model, market leadership and strong management team. 
Financial statement analysis of the five years prior to the investment showed strong 
performance with constant sales growth and profitability. With Riverside’s restructuring plan, 
our base scenario showed an IRR of 33% under initial price assumption of €80 million, well 
within our ZOPA. Risks of a worst-case scenario of 5% IRR are limited with Riverside’s 
restructuring plan. Furthermore, under the industry-based point of view, Euromed’s growth 
potential was strong given a moderate competition level overall with weak supplier bargaining 
power and high entry barriers. From the resource-based point of view, Euromed’s competitive 
advantage in quality, traceability and clinical trials for credibility was extremely valuable for 
its clients, with less than five firms worldwide with these abilities (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
Achieving these competitive advantages took many years and investment in R&D making it 
hard to imitate by competitors and integrate in the organization. Euromed’s hard to imitate 







Second, the decision-making process and valuation methods used to analyze this case gave a 
reasonable approximation to reality, which resulted in an exemplary investment for sustainable 
growth and high returns for investors. Furthermore, real results exemplify that sustainable 
growth can be obtained from an LBO. After negotiations and the due diligence in summer 2015 
both parties agreed on the price of $87,05 million (S&P Capital IQ, 2020a), converted to a little 
over €80 million. Riverside complied all variables required by Meda AB and had two additional 
important advantages over the competition: The prior contact with the target company and high 
liquidity, which could serve Euromed for its future investments (Roig, 2020). After this 
agreement both firms signed the sales and purchase agreement and as agreed in the negotiations, 
a supply contract for over 10 years between Euromed and Meda AB was finalized. With this 
contract, Meda secured Euromed as their ingredient’s provider for key products. The sale was 
closed on December 2015 (Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). 
After the transaction, Euromed reached goals sooner than expected. With an average sales 
growth of 14% from 2015 to 2018 (Sabi, 2020), higher than expected by this time, the company 
was able to grow sales about 53% in just three years (The Riverside Company, 2019). COGS 
increased similar to sales. But since the company managed to control the growth of Opex, which 
only increased about 39%, Euromed’s EBITDA was almost doubled from €9 million in 2015 
to €17,6 million in 2018 (Sabi, 2020). The cooperation between Euromed and Riverside seemed 
like a dream team, reaching their objectives in just three years (The Riverside Company, 2019). 
Net income was improved from €8,2 million to €12,7 million, a significant increase of almost 
55% (Sabi, 2020). 
The positive transformation of Euromed was also rapidly notable in its Balance Sheet. NFO 
increased about 39%. And while the payment period was increased from 25 to 37 days, both 
the collection period (from 45 to 40 days) as well as days of inventory (from 225 to 190 days) 
decreased significantly. This resulted in a decrease of the NFO/sales ratio from 64% to 56%. 
FA increased about 32%, faster than we expected it to grow, but due to the faster sales growth, 
it is understandable. Equity increased as expected about 39%. Since goodwill is not accounted 
for in Sabi database, debt accounted for significantly less than expected and decreased about 
24%. Cash surplus increased from €4,1 million in 2015 to over €5 million in 2018 (Sabi, 2020). 
Although we expected a faster growth of cash in our forecast, the company generated positive 
cash flow for shareholders from the beginning of the project on. This shows that, more cash 
was used to finance operations rather than investing this cash flow in equity. 
Third, knowing Euromed’s business well and the early timing of exit were two key factors for 
the successful outcome of Riverside’s investment. The rapid achievement of goals, possibly 
reached so fast due to previously getting to know Euromed’s business, let Riverside start an 
exit process earlier than planned. According to Álvarez-Nóvoa (2020) timing the right moment 
to sell was an important factor for a positive project outcome. On one hand, since all objectives 
had already been reached, the private equity firm and its investments were no longer necessary 
for the target company’s success. It was time for an industry player to use the created assets and 
work with the established capital. As suggested by McKinsey & Company (2018) further 







was the case of Euromed. On the other hand, the market offered attractive sale conditions with 
higher EBITDA multiples than the one used in its previous purchase. In 2017, M&A multiples 
“remained at their highest levels on more than a decade” (Green, Hayes, Seghers, & Zaets, 
2018). So, Riverside decided to sell Euromed for over $220 million to Dermapharm AG (S&P 
Capital IQ, 2020a), a leading pharmaceutical company from Germany (Dermapharm AG, n.d.). 
The early exit brought Riverside an even higher IRR than planned. Xavier Roig is convinced 
that “after having enjoyed a fantastic experience with Riverside, [Euromed] continues to pursue 
the initiated course” (Roig, 2020). 
Although this case study provides empirically rich contribution to the theory and application of 
decision-making process, it has limitations. A forecast is an educated approximation of the 
future. However, given the variability of critical factors that determine an investment’s success 
such as sales growth, gross margin and Opex, a forecast cannot be 100% accurate. While risk 
can be limited, it cannot be eliminated. Furthermore, the generalization of a single case study 
must be done carefully, adapting to each situation as it is not a robust sample. 
This case study provides evidence that a PE firm can create sustainable value in the middle 
market using an LBO. However, we are far from having diminishing marginal returns on case 
studies that improve skills for LBOs in middle market with value creation as very few case 
studies on this topic exist in published sources. Thus, there is room for further research on the 
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The first step when investing in a company is to understand the 
business (Martínez, 2012). Understanding a business from the 
buyers perspective includes understanding what Euromed sold, 
their clients and their competitive advantage. This provides 
context to determine growth potential, problems that need to be 
solved (if any) and strategic fit with the fund’s criteria. If the 
business fits with the fund’s startegy (investment criteria), 
understanding the business also allows for more accurate 
assumptions for the financial forecasts used to valuate the 
company. 
2. Identification of 
investment 
opportunity 
It is important to comprehend what Riverside identified in  
Euromed that resulted attractive for them to invest in the 
company. 
3. Investment criteria The investment criteria provides the 3-5 main standards to 
determine if the target company fits the fund’s strategy. 
4. Acquisition process Once the private equity knows why they are buying (strategic 
fit), it’s important to understand all the steps the private equity 
made to make their final decision. 
5. Valuation methods Understating the valuation method a firm uses teaches us how 
the company determines how much it expects to make and how 
much it can pay. Thus, Riversides perspective provides insight 
on how Rivierside determined what Euromed was worth to them 
in 2015 and profitability of the investment at a given bid price. 
6. Negotiation process Insight on the negotiation process provides information on any 
significant detail to highlight, such as who they negotiated with 
and what information was used as leverage to determine price 
and other conditions. 
7. Financing of the 
operation 
A big part of the investment process is determening how the 
operation will be financed. This decision determines the debt 
burden placed on the target company. For example, a target will 
have a higher debt burden if levarage was used for the operation 
and debt was transferred to the target company. Financing of the 
operation impacts the forecast of future performance of the 
company used in DCF valuation menthod as it is related with the 









8. Final agreements for 
acquisition 
The final agreement serves as a point of reference for the 
decision making process that is being simulated in this case 
study as a teaching tool. Thus, by the end of the case study, we 
can conclude if we agree with the decision Riverside made and 
identify if anything could have been done differently. 
9. Exit Strategy A goal must be established to determine if an investment will be 
successful or not. Along with initial price paid and growth from 
restructuring plan, the exit strategy is one of the main drivers of 
profitability, which is a key determinant on whether to invest or 
not in the target company (Martínez, 2012). 
10. About Riverside Knowing about Riverside shed’s light on their intentions with 
Euromed, track record, way of operation and gives context to 
their decision making process. Furthermore, it exemplifies the 





Riverside’s contribution to Euromed reflects the firms plans for 
acquisition (what Riverside intends to do with Euromed in order 
to get a return on their investment; this is their restructuring plan) 
and real outcome of the case as point of reference. Based on 
Riverside’s restructuring plan, assumptions for P&L and 
Balance Sheet forecast can be fine tuned. 
Source: adapted from Martínez Abascal, (2012) 
Annex B: In-Depth Interview with Xavier Roig Moderation Guide Topics 
Topic Justification 
1. Euromed’s History Euromed’s history provides context to properly analyze 
evolution of financial statements. Looking at the past helps 
predict the future, which is needed to create assumptions for 




a. Product  
(including details 
of number of 
product families 
or types) 






Obtaining business information directly from the source 
(Euromed) will provide context on Riverside’s interpratation of 
the business. It also provides a deeper, more detailed, 
explanation of Euromed’s operation to fine tune and critic 








3. Negotation Process This will allow us to get Euromed’s perspective of the 
negotiation, keeping in mind that the seller is Meda (Euromed’s 
parent company at the time). It will give us insight on how top 
management felt about the acquisition. We can expect good 
performance from a content management team and visa versa. 
4. Final agreements for 
acquisition 
This information is used to complement and validate data 
provided from Riverside’s perspective. It also allows to probe if 
management received any compensation in shares (a common 
practice in PE (Barber & Goold, 2007)). 
5. Exit Strategy Provides complementary information to data provided by 
Riverside. 
Source: adapted from Martínez Abascal, (2012) 




P&L (Thousand euros) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
  Operating revenue / turnover 34.124  34.027  37.115  39.872  42.592  
  COGS 14.741  14.233  16.643  18.245  19.357  
Gross profit 19.383  19.794  20.472  21.627  23.235  
  Cost of employees 5.310    5.458    5.630    5.946    6.477    
  Other operating items 6.788    7.027    7.251    7.627    7.680    
Opex 12.098  12.485  12.881  13.573  14.156  
EBITDA 7.285    7.309    7.591    8.054    9.078    
Depreciation 1.589    1.535    1.595    1.962    2.047    
EBIT Operating P/L 5.696    5.774    5.996    6.092    7.031    
  Financial revenue 21         74         108       67         24         
   Extraordinary P/L 47         428       87         125       4.008    
P/L before tax 5.428    6.349    5.845    6.950    11.433  
  Taxation 1.489    1.353    1.499    2.158    3.198    
  P/L for period 3.938    4.996    4.347    4.792    8.234    
  P/L for period 3.938    4.996    4.347    4.792    8.234    
P&L ratios 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Growth of sales 12% 0% 9% 7% 7%
Gross Margin / Sales 57% 58% 55% 54% 55%
Growth of opex 8% 3% 3% 5% 4%
Opex / Sales 35% 37% 35% 34% 33%
EBITDA / Sales 21% 21% 20% 20% 21%
ROS (Net income / Sales) 12% 15% 12% 12% 19%
RONA (EBIT / Net assets) 18% 16% 15% 15% 18%







Annex D: Balance Sheet from 2011-2015 
 
 
Annex E: Short Balance Sheet from 2011-2015 
 
 
Annex F: P&L Main Items Definition 
In finance, it is common that confusion exists due to differences in terminology. Therefore, it 
is recommended to clarify the definition of the items used (Martínez, 2012). Below are the 
definitions for the main items used in the P&L of Euromed for this case study: 
• Costs of Goods Sold (COGS): This cost is a percentage of sales. Therefore, it varies with 
changes in sales (Martínez, 2012). For Euromed, it includes the cost of materials (supplies) 
and changes of inventories of finished goods. 
• Gross Margin: It is the sales minus the COGS. Consequently, it is also a percentage of 
sales. 
Changes
 Balance sheet (Thousand euros) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011-15
Fixed Assets 12.625 13.673 15.551 14.368 12.522 -103
Stock Inventory 17.106 19.092 22.389 23.453 26.213 9.107
Receivables 2.971 5.653 6.109 5.445 5.299 2.328
Other current assets 2.639 2.744 1.397 1.419 1.443 -1.196
Cash & cash equivalent 3.116 1.545 1.173 2.538 4.100 983
Current assets 25.832 29.034 31.069 32.854 37.055 11.223
Total assets 38.457 42.708 46.620 47.222 49.577 11.120
0
Equity 33.190 36.244 38.587 40.375 40.976 7.786
Long-term debt 0 184 253 1.844 1.318 1.318
Other non-current liabilities 1.058 1.399 1.281 1.008 1.010 -47
Non current liabilities 1.058 1.583 1.534 2.852 2.328 1.271
0
Current liabilities 4.209 4.881 6.499 3.996 6.272 2.063
Total shareh. funds & liab. 38.457 42.708 46.620 47.222 49.577 11.120
Changes
Short Balance sheet (Thousand euros) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011-15
NFO 18.507 22.609 25.631 26.824 27.186 47%
Fixed assets 12.625 13.673 15.551 14.368 12.522 -1%
Net assets 31.132 36.282 41.182 41.192 39.708 28%
Equity 33.190 36.244 38.587 40.375 40.976 23%
Proviss & Other Liab. 1.058 1.399 1.281 1.008 1.010 -4%
Debt (long & short term) 0 184 2.488 2.347 1.821
Financing 34.248 37.827 42.356 43.730 43.808 28%
Cash 3.116 1.545 1.173 2.538 4.100 23%







• Operating expenses (Opex): These expenses are salaries and other fixed costs such as 
utilities. Theoretically it is a fixed expense but in practice it varies with sales (Martínez, 
2012). 
• Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA): Also known as 
operating income. The operating income is calculated by subtracting Opex from the gross 
margin (Martínez, 2012). 
 
Annex G: Balance Sheet Main Items Definition 
In finance, it is common that confusion exists due to differences in terminology. Therefore, it 
is recommended to clarify the definition of the items used (Martínez, 2012). Below are the 
definitions for the main items used in Euromed’s Balance Sheet for this case study: 
• Cash: In form of liquid money (cash), this represents current accounts and temporary 
financial investments (Martínez, 2012). 
• Receivables: Invoices representing the money that customer owe the company (Martínez, 
2012). 
• Stock inventory: Stock necessary for operations (Martínez, 2012). This inventory 
accumulation can be raw materials, work-in progress and/or finished goods (Kenton, 
2019). 
• Fixed assets (FA): Long-term assets minus accumulated depreciation. Usually they are 
assets like buildings, offices, plants, machinery, etc. Thus, they barely change over time, 
reason why they are called “fixed” (Martínez, 2012). 
• Payables: Money that the company owes to its suppliers due to a purchase on credit 
(Martínez, 2012). 
• Short-term debt (STD): Usually a credit line or other form of debt for a short period of 
time. Mostly given by banks or other institutions of the capital market. Therefore, the 
company pays interest to the lenders (Martínez, 2012). 
• Long-term debt (LTD): A financing item negotiated usually with banks for a long period 
of time. The company pays interest to the lenders. Often in form of loans, mortgages or 
others (Martínez, 2012). 
• Debt (D): The sum of STD and LTD. 








The Balance Sheet can be transformed into the short Balance Sheet presented below. The 
following items must be defined for the short Balance Sheet: 
 
Source: Sagarra (2019) 
• Need of funds for operations (NFO): Martínez Abascal (2012) defines it as funds required 
to finance daily operations of a company. It is calculated by the following formula: 
NFO = cash necessary + receivables + stock inventory - payables - other liabilities 
If we assume zero cash necessary and a small amount of other liabilities, then the formula 
is reduced to: 
NFO = receivables + stock inventory - payables 
• Net assets (NA): The sum of NFO and FA. 
• Financing: Consists of the company’s equity, debt and provisions and other liabilities. 
 
Annex H: Main Assumptions for P&L Forecast 
Below are assumptions used for P&L forecast. These assumptions are hypothesis of how 
Riverside’s restructuring plan will impact financial data. Thus, we analyzed how Euromed 
would perform if it continued to operate as it did in the past, considering industry data and then 
quantified the impact of Riverside’s investment. 
• Sales growth of 10% annually from 2016-2020. Total sales growth during Riverside’s 5-
year hold on Euromed was projected at around 60%. Pessimist scenario is 8% growth a 
year and the optimistic scenario is 12% annual sales growth from 2016-2020. 
Justification: Total sales growth provided by Rafael Álvarez-Nóvoa was spread out evenly 
amongst the last 5-year investment plan for organic growth. A 2% difference was 
considered to evaluate a worse and best-case scenario. In a best-case scenario specific 
actions that would be taken by Riverside to push sales growth were considered for the 2% 







aligned with the CAGR of 8.1% between 2014-2018 projected for the biotechnology 
industry (MarketLine, 2019). 
• Margin/Sales ratio are expected to increase by 1% every year, starting in 2016. For the 
pessimistic scenario the Margin/Sales ratio was assumed to increase 0%, and 2% increase 
was assumed for the optimistic scenario. 
Justification: Due to the competitive supply agreement with Meda AB to close the 
negotiations, it was expected that Margin/Sales ratio would decrease by 4% the first year 
of the operation.  Riverside’s plan to introduce new product launches every year and regular 
price controls was intended to increase margin by 1% a year starting 2016. Worst case, the 
new product launches would have no effect on the margin/sales ratio and in the best case 
an additional 2% increase would be expected. 
• A new systematic approach to R&D would require incorporating a new Scientific 
Marketing Director and creating an R&D committee with industry experts from around the 
world. Investments in R&D would represent 7% increase in Opex starting 2016. In a worst-
case scenario Opex would increase 9% and in the best-case scenario the increase would be 
5%. 
Justification: Data in Mercantile Registry of Spain indicates Opex growth of 38,6%, in 
accordance with investments made to increase product development and production. By 
2018 Euromed reached investment forecast, thus final numbers in 2018 are taken as 
reference for investment goals and budget. 
• For depreciation, we assumed 1,9 million euros a year. 
Justification: This is based on average depreciation of Euromed’s financial data in Sabi 
database for 2016-2018. The assumption is revalidated with average depreciation for the 
years 2013-2015, which have the same average for this account as in years 2016-2018. 
• Interest rate at 2,5% for STD and 7,5% for LTD. 
Justification: Fixed interest rates were considered for both STD and LTD. Interest rates 
assumptions for debt were estimated based on criteria by Martínez Abascal (2012) for 
common bank commissions. Criteria included Euromed’s operational risk, Riverside’s 
profitability and economic environment (i.e. profitability of short-term treasury bills and 
the profitability of 5-year bonds). The final values were defined by Martínez Abascal, as 








Annex I: Main Assumptions for Balance Sheet Forecast 
The following assumptions for the forecast of Euromed’s Balance Sheet have been made based 
on historical data and the planned actions during the company’s ownership by Riverside. 
• Need of funds for operations (NFO) from 2016-2020 make 64% of total sales of each 
respective year. 
Justification: Historical data from Sabi database from the past five years shows that the 
NFO made around 64% of total sales on average. Due to no further planned changes of the 
payment terms by Riverside, this share is assumed to stay fix over the time of the 
investment project. However, it is notable that Euromed should lower the relative share of 
its inventory of NFO, resulting in a decrease of the days of inventory and a decrease of 
NFO. Due to a low payment period, Euromed had more flexibility on this factor and could 
increase the payment period, increasing the proportion of payables of NFO. We assumed 
that this adjustment of the shares of inventory and payables of the NFO balance out. As 
result, NFO continues stable at 64% of sales. 
• Fixed assets (FA) grow annually around €3 million from 2016 to 2020. 
Justification: Reason behind this assumption is the purchase of the new innovation center 
for €2,5 million and new machinery for the drying process for around €2,3 million 
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020). Both investments are assumed to get depreciated over the time of 
the project. For simplicity, the total sum of almost €5 million is spread over the five years 
of the project. Assuming to invest the same amount of €1,9 million of annual fix 
depreciation in fixed assets explains the annual growth of €3 million. 
• Goodwill was calculated to be €40,3 million, which was added to the net assets (NA). 
Justification: The goodwill is the intangible asset, “the portion of the purchase price that is 
higher than the sum of the net fair value of all of the assets purchased in the acquisition and 
the liabilities assumed in the process” (Hargrave, 2020a). It this case it can be calculated 
as the difference between the initial price paid and the net assets in 2015 before the sale of 
the company. 
• The equity invested in 2015 (post sale) was estimated at €40 million. This equity grows 
every year about the difference between the net income of the respective year and the 
dividends paid in this year. 
Justification: The equity invested in 2015 can be calculated with the information from 
section 4.5.5. With the initial price of €80 million, funded with 50% equity and 50% debt 
(Álvarez-Nóvoa, 2020), the equity for 2015 after the sale would be €40 million. It is 








• Provisions and other liabilities (Proviss & Other Liab.) stay fix at €1 million annually from 
2016-2020. 
Justification: Historical data from Sabi database proves that provisions and other liabilities 
didn’t change dramatically during recent years before the sale and have been around €1 
million per year. So, we expect them to continue stable at this value. 
• Short-term debt finances 100% of NFO from 2016 to 2020. 
Justification: In order to maximize the cash flow for shareholders we assume short-term 
debt to cover 100% of NFO. Furthermore, this simplifies the calculations of forecast 
volatility. 
• Long-term debt stays fix at €11,8 million for the entire project duration. 
Justification: We assume the needed source of fund to finance all net assets at the beginning 
of the project to be a bullet loan. The value of the bullet loan was calculated as difference 
between net assets and the sum of equity, short-term debt and provisions and other 
liabilities. As typical for a bullet loan this amount stays fix over the time of the project and 
gets paid back when the project ends. 
• Cash flow for the shareholders can be calculated as generated cash per year. The generated 
cash per year is the difference of cash surplus in this year and the cash surplus of the 
previous year. 
Justification: We assume the cash surplus to be zero after the sale in year 2015. Thus, we 
don’t have any cash in the balance sheet when the project starts. This cash account changes 
with the cash surplus generated (or cash needed) every year. The cash surplus (or cash 
needed in form of credit) is calculated as difference between financing and net assets. When 
financing is bigger than net assets, meaning the company has more funds than needed, it 
generates additional money in the cash account. On the other side, when net assets are 
bigger than the financing part, the company needs more credit to finance its assets 









Annex J: P&L Forecast 
 
 
Guidelines for P&L forecast: 
(1) Sales growth from 2016 on, see assumptions “Growth of sales” 
(2) Gross margin 2015 post sale: Gross margin pre-sale. From 2016 on: see annual increase 
assumptions in “Margin / Sales” 
(3)  Opex 2015: Increase due to investment in R&D and Equipment (see assumptions in 
“Change in opex”). 
(4) Depreciation from 2016 on: see assumptions in line “Depreciation”. 
(5) Goodwill Depreciation assumption 0%. 
(6) Interests for the short-term debt: 2,5% of total debt of previous year. 
(7) Interests for the long-term debt: 7,5% of total debt of previous year. 




P&L in 000€ Assumptions 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Sales (turnover) 42.592 46.851 51.536 56.690 62.359 68.595
COGS 19.357 22.957 24.737 26.644 28.685 30.868
Gross margin 23.235 23.894 26.799 30.046 33.674 37.727
Opex / Overhead 14.156 15.147 16.208 17.342 18.556 19.855
EBITDA 9.078 8.747 10.591 12.704 15.118 17.872
Depreciation 1.900 2.047 1.900 1.900 1.900 1.900 1.900
Goodwill Depreciation 0% n.a. 0 0 0 0 0
EBIT 7.031 6.847 8.691 10.804 13.218 15.972
Interests (S/T debt) 2,5% n.a. -680 -750 -825 -907 -998
Interests (L/T debt) 7,5% -393 -886 -886 -886 -886 -886
  Extraordinary P/L 4.008
EBT 11.433 5.281 7.056 9.093 11.425 14.088
Taxes 25% 3.198 1.320 1.764 2.273 2.856 3.522
Net Income 8.234 3.961 5.292 6.820 8.568 10.566
P&L ratios Assumptions (in bold and green)
Growth of sales 7% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Margin / Sales 1% 55% 51% 52% 53% 54% 55%
Opex / Sales 33% 32% 31% 31% 30% 29%
Change in opex 4% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
EBITDA / Sales 21% 19% 21% 22% 24% 26%
ROS (Net income / Sales) 19% 8% 10% 12% 14% 15%
ROE (Net income / Equity) 20% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14%







Annex K: Balance Sheet Forecast 
 
Guidelines for Balance Sheet forecast: 
(1) NFO 2015 Post Sale: NFO pre-sale. From 2016 on, see NFO/sales ratio assumptions. 
(2) FA in 2015 Post Sale: FA pre-sale. From 2016 on, see FA annual growth assumptions. 
(3)  Equity 2015 Post Sale: Initial equity invested. From 2016 on: Equity = previous one + 
net income of current year. 
(4) Proviss & Other Liab. stay fix over the time of the project, as assumptions suggest. 
(5) Short-term debt to finance 100% of NFO. 
(6) Long-term debt as bullet loan for the time of the project. Stays fix at the value from 
2015 Post Sale. 
(7) We will have cash in the Balance Sheet. The difference of cash from one year to other 
is the cash flow for the shareholders. 
(8) Goodwill in 2015 Post Sale can be calculated as: Goodwill = Initial Price – Net assets 
Pre Sale. 
(9) Long-term debt in 2015 Post Sale can be calculated as: L/T debt = NA – (Equity + 




Balance (000€) Assumptions 2015 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NFO       64% 27.186 27.186 29.985 32.983 36.281 39.910 43.901
FA, Fixed assets net 3.000 12.522 12.522 13.622 14.722 15.822 16.922 18.022
Goodwill 40.292 40.292 40.292 40.292 40.292 40.292
NA, Net assets 39.708 80.000 83.899 87.997 92.395 97.123 102.214
E,   Equity 40.976 40.000 43.961 49.253 56.072 64.641 75.207
Proviss & Other Liab. 1.000 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   D-S, S/T debt n.a. 27.186 29.985 32.983 36.281 39.910 43.901
   D-L, L/T debt 1.000.000 n.a. 11.814 11.814 11.814 11.814 11.814 11.814
D,  Debt total 1.821 39.000 41.799 44.797 48.095 51.723 55.714
Financing 43.808 80.000 86.759 95.050 105.167 117.364 131.921
    Cash surplus (+) 4.100 0 2.861 7.053 12.772 20.241 29.707
Cash generated per year 1.562 n.a. 2.861 4.192 5.720 7.468 9.466
NFO vs. WC
NFO 29.985 32.983 36.281 39.910 43.901
WC 42.153 46.344 52.064 59.533 68.999











Annex M: DCF Valuation of Euromed Buyer’s Perspective 
 
 




Company Country Market EV EBITDA Sales Growth
Cap. (€  Mn) (€  Mn) 2014A 2015E 2016E 2014A 2015E 2016E margin 2015 (14A-15E)
Kerry Group Ireland 11.851 13.133 2,3 2,2 2,2 18,2 16,3 15,2 13,6% 2,4%
Royal DSM Netherlands 9.465 11.978 1,3 1,4 1,5 14,8 10,5 10,2 13,7% -8,8%
Symrise Germany 7.795 8.997 4,2 3,4 3,2 n.m. 15,2 14,3 22,4% 24,4%
Sensient United States 2.879 3.386 2,6 2,7 2,6 n.m. 14,2 12,6 19,1% -5,5%
Frutarom Israel 2.282 2.454 3,5 3,1 2,8 19,1 16,1 14,5 19,0% 13,6%
Naturex France 640 801 2,4 2,1 2,0 n.m. 15,7 13,0 13,4% 15,6%
Average 2,7 2,5 2,4 17,4 14,7 13,3 16,9% 7,0%
Median 2,5 2,5 2,4 18,2 15,5 13,7 16,4% 8,0%
EV/Sales (x) EV/EBITDA (x)
Transactions. Natural extracts EV / EBITDA
Date Target Country Bidder EV (€ Mn) EV/Sales (x) EBITDA (x) margin (%)
Feb 15 Ingrenat Spain Frutarom 8 1,0 n.a. n.a.
Okt 11 Burgundy Botanical ExtractsFrance Naturex 13 1,3 n.a. n.a.
Jan 08 Berkem France Naturex 10 2,5 7,3 n.a.
Dez 07 Chart Corporation USA Naturex 12 2,1 6,8 31%
Jan 07 Hammer Pharma UK Naturex 10 1,3 10,5 12%
Average 1,6 8,2 22%
Median 1,3 7,3 22%
CF Calculation 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
± Variation of NA -3.899 -4.098 -4.398 -4.728 -5.091
± Variation of Debt 2.799 2.998 3.298 3.628 3.991
± Net Income 3.961 5.292 6.820 8.568 10.566
Final sale at multiple = 8 116.969
Initial equity invested -40.000
CF shareholder/ Equity CF -40.000 2.861 4.192 5.720 7.468 126.436
PV with a K = 25% PV = 52.389 IRR = 32,79% NPV = 12.389
Assumptions to change => Initial price = 80.000 Equity invested= 40.000
CF Calculation 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
± Variation of NA -1.981 -2.042 -2.185 -2.338 -2.501
± Variation of Debt 1.981 2.042 2.185 2.338 2.501
± Net Income 3.807 4.548 5.356 6.235 7.189
Final sale at multiple = 8 83.324
Initial equity invested 0
CF shareholder/ Equity CF 0 3.807 4.548 5.356 6.235 90.513
PV with a K = 15% PV = 58.837 IRR = n.a. NPV = n.a.
